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HARD CASES FROM EASY CASES GROW:
IN DEFENSE OF THE FACT- AND LAWINTENSIVE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CASE
JAMES C. MAY*

INTRODUCTION

In a recent essay in the pages of the CLINICAL LAW REVIEW,'
Paul Reingold, Director of the University of Michigan Clinical Law
Program, made a strong case for why civil practice clinics,
specialized (handling one or two types of cases) and general
programs alike, should take on "hard" cases as opposed to "easy,"
routine ones. No doubt Reingold's essay touched a nerve in many a
clinical teacher: who among us has not wrestled with the dilemma
of balancing students' learning needs with our own professional
development as attorneys and teachers?
Reingold's essay at the outset fairly presents the case for the
"opposing view," that is, that students learn better by doing the
simpler, more routine cases typically associated with many
specialized clinics and general clinics that do not take on overly
complex matters. He then asserts that a steady dose of such cases
can be destructive, or at least dulling, to clinical students as well
as faculty (and, ultimately, to the reputation of the clinic itself).
After giving his definition of what a "hard" case is, he gives
examples of two such cases handled in his own clinic, and tells of
the powerful, beneficial effect they had on everyone associated
with them.2
This essay is a response to Reingold's article. I argue that
while he is certainly on solid ground in recommending that tough
cases be tackled, he underestimates the potential of apparently
routine service matters not only to constitute suitable teaching
material beut also to rise to the level of difficult cases. I will
demonstrate this by highlighting two veterans benefits cases
* Clinical Professor of Law, Vermont Law School, and Director, South
Royalton Legal Clinic. Special thanks are due to Mark Klarich, a former clinic
student, and Jennifer Johnson and Errol Tabacco, work-study students, for
their help in organizing materials for this article, and to the clients who

allowed their stories to be told.
1. Paul D. Reingold, Why Hard Cases Make Good (Clinical) Law, 2
CLINICAL L. REV. 545 (1996).

2. Id.
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handled by Vermont Law School's South Royalton Legal Clinic, a
general clinic which does primarily legal aid-type service cases of
widely varying complexity and difficulty.
I.

OF EASY AND HARD CASES, AND WHY CLINICIANS

Do THEM

As Reingold's essay points out, there are plenty of defensible
reasons advanced for why some clinics specialize in doing
repetitive casework in just a few areas of law, and why even nonspecialized, general clinics tend to do simpler cases.
The
argument for specialization was succinctly stated: "Students get to
handle routine cases in a way that lets them build on what they
have done before, and students are better positioned to see the
broader policy issues within the specialty, as well as to engage in
law reform.
Similarly, Reingold points out that where skills training is
seen as the main justification for a clinic's existence, the following
values and goals have traditionally been advanced to justify
focusing on simpler matters:
COMPLETENESS AND RESPONSIBILITY: Students who
are able to handle a case from start to finish get to see the process
as a whole, and may get to engage in hearing representation in
which they make the major decisions, thus developing a sense of
personal and professional responsibility.4
SAFETY: Cases with smaller dollar stakes pose "a lower risk
of serious error or malpractice." Also, since more "easy" cases can
be supervised than difficult ones, the value of repetition is
enhanced and the chance of error diminished. 5
SERVICE: Easier cases, because they tend to be noncontroversial and done in volume, generate less opposition within
the community and provide a greater public relations benefit to
the law school, since students are seen as serving the needs of the
indigent in an era of shrinking free legal resources.6
SERENDIPITY: "The more cases that a clinic processes in a
term, the greater the chances that some of them will present
interesting and useful ethical [and other] issues."7
THE ACADEMIC CALENDAR: Deprived of clinical students
to work on cases in the summer, and facing the necessity of using
that season to pursue writing projects in order to keep their jobs,
clinical faculty, as a survival mechanism, need to be able to wrap
up most of their cases in May and June each year. This can only
be done with "easy" cases.8
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

Id. at 545 (footnotes omitted).
Id. at 548-49.
Id.
Reingold, supra note 1, at 548-49.
Id. at 550.
Id. at 548-51.
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Despite these apparent virtues of simpler, repetitive cases,
which were the norm in his clinic in the early 1980s, attorney
Reingold found that they were personally unsatisfying for three
reasons, all of which will be familiar to experienced clinical
faculty:
1. Routine, simple cases were boring, and, worse, promoted
uncreative, stereotypical thinking among the faculty.
2. Weak or non-existent opposition, such as in some landlordtenant litigation and social security disability matters, eliminated
various skills opportunities for clinicians, such as jury trials or
simply having to overcome competent, zealous opposing counsel.
3. Clinical students, themselves bored by cases that were too
easy, indicated little interest in pursuing public interest careers
based upon their clinical experiences. 9
For these reasons, Reingold and his colleagues set out to
transform their general civil clinic, by way of increasing credits,
teaching more substantive law, creating an advanced clinical
experience for veterans of the clinic, and revamping the caseload.
This last reform was achieved with the assistance of the U.S.
Department of Education's Title IX Law School Clinical
Experience Program, which allowed the faculty to hire highly
qualified attorney-faculty so that they could develop areas of
specialty in two areas (prisoners' civil rights and employment
discrimination) within the general civil clinic, and take on tougher
issues within the general clinic's traditional areas of expertise,
housing law and mental health law.
As a result of these changes, the Michigan civil clinic was able
to take on a number of "hard" cases, such as the Michigan state
civil rights aspect of the International Union, UAW v. Johnson
Controls" case and a collection of cases, ultimately certified as a
federal class action, challenging Michigan's amendment of its
statutes to reduce the frequency of parole review for long-term
inmates. Reingold provides an insightful evaluation, listing both
pro's and con's, of the clinic's handling of these "hard" cases, a
term which he defines as having these characteristics: The "hard"
case:
(1) poses the risk of taxing the program's resources; (2) may be
controversial either in the public eye or to some constituent group of
the law school; (3) is likely to outlive (figuratively if not literally) the

9. Id. at 553-54.
10. 499 U.S. 187 (1991). While the United Auto Workers' counsel pursued
the Title VII case to the U.S. Supreme Court, individual Michigan plaintiffs,
represented by the Michigan Law School Civil Clinic, relied on state law to
challenge Johnson Controls' failure to rehire them after a layoff before the
Michigan Department of Civil Rights. At issue in all cases was the company's
policy to bar all fertile women, as defined, from specific jobs making batteries,
due to environmental hazards.
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students assigned to it, and (4) presents legal issues of a scope,
scale, character,
or complexity not ordinarily handled by the
11
program.
II. A RECURRING PROBLEM
Clinic directors and faculty, not to mention law school deans
and curriculum committees, have long struggled with issues of
clinic caseload design. In another (and even more recent) article in
the CLINICAL LAW REVIEW, Veteran clinician Philip Schrag of

Georgetown University recently described how his law faculty
dealt with choosing goals, subject matter and intensity of clinical
practice over the past two decades.1 2
Beginning with the
proposition that clinic design must be a function of rationally
selected and articulated goals,1" Schrag describes fifteen oftencited goals which have guided him in his work over three decades
creating six different clinical programs. Goals selected will "point
[a clinic] in either direction with respect to the question of whether
to specialize at all." 4 In addition to the rationales cited by
Reingold for choosing to specialize or not, or to do simpler, more
repetitive cases or not, Schrag specifically recognizes that "[a]
significant extrinsic factor affecting the choice to specialize is the
nature of the community in which a clinic is located. In a small
city, for example, the paucity of cases of one or two particular
types may preclude specialization." 5
Schrag tells two instructive stories about clinic design at
Georgetown's Center for Applied Legal Studies (CALS). In the
early 1980s, following a decision by the school's administration to
limit clinical terms to a single semester, the CALS staff
reevaluated its program and, in light of its primary goal of
11. Reingold, supra note 1, at 546-47.
12. Philip G. Schrag, ConstructingA Clinic, 3 CLINICAL L. REV. 175 (1996).
13. Id. at 179. Schrag quotes Peter T. Hoffman on the subject: "An effective
clinical course should be the result of a rational process of selecting and
adapting specific means to specified ends [starting with] the determination of
course objectives [but this sequence] is rarely followed in reality." Id. (quoting
Peter T. Hoffman, Clinical Course Design and the Supervisory Process, 1982
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 277, 278 n.4 (1982)).
14. Schrag, supra note 12, at 191. See also Association of American Law
Schools, Report of the Committee on the Future of the In-House Clinic, 42 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 508, 553-54 (1992) [hereinafter In-House Clinic Future] (making
the same point while simultaneously calling for an expansion of the definition
of the appropriate clinic case).
15. Schrag, supra note 12, at 191. Schrag sees the proper decision making
sequence as first deciding whether cases should be larger and more complex,
or "smaller," and from there proceeding to choose areas of specialization; the
latter choice, he recognizes, is influenced by a number of important extrinsic
factors, such as case-type requirements of funding sources; student practice
rules; levels of student interest, coordination with the law school's curriculum,
and other factors. Id.
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"devolving as much responsibility to students as possible," chose to
focus its caseload on Social Security disability and consumer
protection small claims matters. Both types of cases would involve
significant work (or even be able to be completed) within one term,
and while the Social Security work was mainly fact-specific, it did
involve work with experts, while16the consumer protection cases
"offered endless legal complexity."
But by 1994, the staff sought to diversify its case offerings to
meet the clinical faculty's desire to learn new areas of practice,
and the students' desires to work in the area of international
human rights. Ultimately, the faculty chose to work in the area of
asylum hearings before U.S. Immigration and Naturalization
Service (INS) hearing officers and resulting court hearings before
U.S. immigration judges. Each type of case might be substantially
completed within a semester's time, but while the cases were, from
that perspective, manageable, they were not minor or small cases.
As Schrag observes: "Each case involved high stakes, because a
client could be deported to torture and death in her own country,
but the universe of relevant facts and law could easily be mastered
by a student within the clinic's semester." 7
Thus, while faculty and student desire for change did indeed
result in change at both Michigan and Georgetown, the faculty at
Georgetown maintained its goal of devolving significant
responsibility upon each student by selecting repetitive-type cases
that were challenging both factually and legally, yet were able to
be substantially completed within a semester. The larger issue
then becomes whether, as a general matter, service cases can rise
to or near the level of the "hard" cases Reingold describes, or at
least do so often enough to satisfy the interest levels of both
faculty and students, and still provide challenging learning
experiences that meet the clinic's goals. I believe that they can.
Indeed, for smaller schools that only offer one or two clinics, and
have limited numbers of clinical faculty, they must. This would
not preclude such clinics from also taking on some cases that are,
from the outset, more difficult, complex and challenging.
III.

REPETITIVE SERVICE-TYPE CASES ARE APPROPRIATE TEACHING
VEHICLES

A. Regardless of the Number or Types of Clinics at a Given
School, Each Clinic Should Have Within Its CaseloadSome
Service-Type Cases, or Casework Functions
There are so many advantages to relatively brief service-type
cases that every clinic should afford its students the opportunity to
16. Id.
17. Id. at 196.
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work on at least one. The high turnover rate of, for example, some
types of welfare, housing, landlord-tenant and family law cases
allows clinic students to perform a wide array of lawyering
functions, see the results of their work, interact personally with
clients, and face and resolve ethical issues. Even in specialty
clinics featuring more complex cases in fewer legal areas,
reserving some time for initial intakes and day-to-day solving of
clients' problems makes sense.
But brief service cases alone do not reflect what a practicing
lawyer's caseload looks like after a year or two. For that reason,
every clinic should strive to offer students as balanced a set of
client- and skills-related experiences as possible. This relates to
both subject matter of cases accepted, and the learning
opportunities of many types (analysis, traditional skills, crosscultural exposure, etc.) afforded by those cases. Certainly smaller
schools, not blessed with Georgetown's twelve clinics, 8 or
Michigan's five,' 9 must rely upon broad ranges of both case types
and case complexity to provide a balanced clinical caseload."0 This
is particularly true for schools located in smaller communities
which need representation by generalists.2'
B. Repetitive, Service-Type Cases PredictablyMay Ripen into
"Hard"Cases
Assuming that it is a good thing for clinical students to work
on a variety of case types of varying complexity, including "hard"
cases, can enough repetitive, service-type cases ripen into "hard"
18. Schrag, supra note 12, at 178.

19. Michigan has three regular in-house clinics staffed by law school faculty
members (Michigan Clinical Law Program, featuring three concentrations:

civil, criminal and women in poverty; Child Advocacy Law Clinic, and Legal
Assistance for Urban Communities), plus two innovative clinical programs
staffed by outside attorneys (Environmental Law Program, affiliated with the
National Wildlife Federation, and Criminal Appellate Practice). E-mail from
Paul Reingold, Director, University of Michigan Clinical Law Program (Sept.

22, 1998) (on file at the South Royalton Legal Clinic).
20. This is not to imply that even at larger schools, the question of what
case and experience mix to offer within any given clinic is an easy one. Philip
Schrag notes that at Georgetown, each of the dozen clinics has "its own goals,

subject areas, teaching methods, etc." Schrag, supra note 12, at 178 n.10. And
Paul Reingold's article makes clear that in Michigan's Civil Clinic, there are
still a sufficient number of repetitive service-types of cases to guarantee that
students will "get into court early and often." Reingold, supra note 1, at 556.

The issue posed by Reingold is whether any particular clinic, whether
specialty or general, should accept primarily "hard," as opposed to "easy,"
cases. Id. at 546. This raises the question of whether service cases can be, or
become, "hard" cases, and, if so, how many tough cases of this type a clinic

should handle.
21. Both Reingold and Schrag acknowledge that community expectations
play a large part in clinic design and mission. See Reingold, supra note 1, at
549, and Schrag, supra note 12, at 191.
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cases so that a clinic is justified in basing its caseload on them? In
my experience, the answer is yes. Even smaller schools, with far
more limited clinical resources and smaller population bases from
which to draw cases, have no problem in finding some "hard"
cases, because they evolve naturally within the caseload.22 Indeed,
the general caseload can present enough difficult material to keep
virtually every student busy each term on at least one complex
case, while allowing time for each student to work on other
matters that, although less complex, are highly instructive.
Vermont Law School's general civil clinic, known as the South
Royalton Legal Clinic, has had a number of very challenging cases
grow naturally out of its caseload over the years, and they
continue to do so.23 Because of the school's location in an area of
22. Both Reingold and Schrag note that great complexity can flow out of a
standard caseload. Reingold in particular qualifies his definition of a "hard"
case by acknowledging that "this is a loose definition, and ... cases are
relative." Reingold, supra note 1, n.7 at 547. Although he next insists that the
distinction between "hard" and "easy" cases is fairly clear, he admits that his
program "occasionally get[s] blind-sided" by a service-type case that blossoms
into a "hard" one (the example is of a $300 medical bill collection defense that
blossomed into an admirable class action which, four years later, resulted in a
change of state law and multi-million dollar provision of free medical care to
the indigent). Id. In my experience, the evolution of "standard" cases into far
more challenging matters occurs more frequently than occasionally. Of
course, my perspective is itself relative, and may be shaped by the workload in
our campus's only real client clinic.
23. Clinic students have been involved in a variety of federal actions in the
past 15 years, plus a number of Vermont Supreme Court appeals and other
challenging cases. In Derby v. Town of Hartford, 599 F. Supp. 130 (D. Vt.
1984) clinic students successfully challenged a town's loitering ordinance on
vagueness grounds. In Blake v. O'Rourke, Civ. No. 84-208 (D. Vt.) (dismissed
Apr. 22, 1985), clinic students represented a class challenging the 1981 OBRA
legislation which disallowed inclusion of actual work expenses as a factor in
calculating welfare eligibility. The action was dismissed following the U.S.
Supreme Court's decision upholding the legislation in Heckler v. Turner, 470
U.S. 184 (1985). Kendall v. Brock, 689 F. Supp. 354 (D. Vt. 1987), was a class
action challenging the U.S. Department of Labor's failure to provide notice
and opportunity to be heard prior to reduction or termination of federal
workers compensation benefits. The case lasted over two years, had a
preliminary injunction hearing, broad discovery and multiple motions
hearings and status conferences, and a final trial on the merits; it resulted in
a change in the Department's regulations to afford notice and hearing relief
nationwide. Attorney's fees were recovered. In Flint v. U.S. Department of
Agriculture, No. 96-CV-102 (D. Vt. Sept. 26, 1997), plaintiffs challenged
defendant's refusal to extend homestead and leaseback/buyback protection to
them following foreclosure on their farm. Homestead protection was
ultimately afforded. Representation of these clients proceeded, for various
reasons, simultaneously in three courts, federal district, U.S. Bankruptcy and
state superior. Mason v. Thetford School Board., 457 A.2d 647 (Vt. 1983), was
an action by parents challenging a school district's failure to pay tuition for
their child to attend a school of their choice. The case of In re M.L.C., No. 84048 (Vt. June 14, 1985) (dismissed as moot upon the client's release from
confinement during the course of the case), involved a challenge (briefed and
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the state underserved by the local legal services program,24 it was
natural for the law school administration and faculty to choose a
public service focus for the clinic. The clinic's educational goals25
argued) to the constitutionality of Vermont's emergency civil commitment
procedures. In re V.C., 505 A.2d 1214 (Vt. 1985), established that the special
district court dealing with mental health commitments, upon finding that a
patient is not receiving adequate treatment at the state mental hospital, has
the authority to order the Commissioner of Mental Health to make best efforts
to find an appropriate placement (but the court may not mandate any specific
placement).
Two unemployment compensation appeals broke new ground in the state:
in Skudlarek v. Department of Employment, 627 A.2d 340 (Vt. 1993) the court
ruled that an employer's unilaterally imposed significant change in hours (in
that case, an increase) for a part-time worker afforded good cause to quit. In
McGrath v. DET, No. 92-523 (Vt. July 26, 1993) the court ruled, in a fully
reasoned but unpublished opinion, that a claimant subjected to a sexually
hostile work environment had good cause to quit. In Howard v. Department of
Social Welfare, 655 A.2d 1102 (Vt. 1994) the court voided a state welfare
regulation that tracked a federal one, and, relying upon the Americans With
Disabilities Act, ruled that the Department could not refuse to provide ANFC
benefits to 18-year-old students who could not graduate by age 19 due to
disabilities. - Certainly worth numbering among our difficult cases would be
some of our family law matters (primarily contested divorces) and a few of our
federal court disability cases.
24. Vermont Legal Aid (VLA), with which our clinic has always had a
strong working relationship, once was able to provide attorney coverage for
almost the entire state, except for a few "underserved areas," so called
because of their distance from a legal aid office. Vermont Law School, and our
clinic, lies in such an underserved area, on the border of a two-county area
with a significant low-income population. In recent years, VLA's ability to
provide attorney representation statewide has been reduced due to federal
legal services budget cutbacks and restrictions on representation.
25. Not surprisingly, our clinic's goals are comprised within the 15 set out
by Philip Schrag, which include: responsibility, doctrine and institutions,
service,
problem-solving,
collaboration,
cross-cultural
awareness,
understanding the role of emotions, coping with facts, values, ethics,
creativity, authority, learning to learn, traditional skills and students' goals.
See Schrag, supra note 12, at 179-86. Our evaluation criteria list most (but
not all) of these, and virtually all of the others come up in evaluations in
connection with the listed criteria. Four additional goals well worth explicitly
adopting, or at least considering in connection with those listed above, include:
developing analytical skills, dealing with unstructured situations, acting in
role, and critiquing the capacities and limitations of lawyers and the legal
system. See Marjorie A. McDiarmid, What's Going on Down There in the
Basement: In-House Clinics Expand Their Beachhead, 35 N.Y.L.SCH.L.REV.
239, 249 (1990); In-House Clinic Future, supra note 14, at 512-17; Anthony G.
Amsterdam, Clinical Legal Education-A 21st Century Perspective, 34 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 612, 614-17 (1984). See generally American Bar Association,
LEGAL EDUCATION AND PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT-AN EDUCATIONAL

CONTINUUM at 135-221 (1992).
These goals, and even the clinical method itself, are not without their
critics.
Cf. Minna Kotkin, Reconsidering Role Assumption in Clinical
Education, 19 N.M. L. REV. 185 (1989) (challenging the centrality of acting in
role as a hallmark of proper clinical method); Robert Condlin, Socrates' New
Clothes: Substituting Persuasionfor Learning in Clinical PracticeInstruction,
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were well served by a law office that afforded students the
opportunity to represent clients in a wide variety of cases and act
in advocating, negotiating and litigating on their behalf. While
certain cases were minor ones easily resolved in weeks or even
days (e.g., some utility, landlord-tenant and consumer complaints),
other aspects of the caseload created a heavier burden, such as
contested family law matters and impact cases in the public
benefits area. With the exception of child support hearings, at
which relaxed rules of evidence apply, our family law contests are
done subject to the full rules of evidence, and many cases have
involved protracted proceedings over a lengthy period of time.
Because of these demands placed upon us by our public service
caseload, within a few years of its founding, clinic staff decided
both to lengthen the up-front substantive introductory classroom
component 26 and to create a full-time option (13 credits) for the
one-semester course. This proved to be very popular, and allowed
us to broaden our coverage and take on, or continue representation
in, cases of greater complexity. Balanced against this greater
availability of student time was a subsequently created tenuretrack status for the two "regular" full-time members of the clinical
faculty, necessitating release time for writing. A third attorney,
funded with a mix of soft and institutional money, has provided an
important measure of stability in caseload supervision as the other
two attorneys (including the director) have maintained their
progress on the tenure and retention front.
In recent years, students enrolling in the clinic have
increasingly chosen the part-time (six credits) option, in order to
40 MD. L. REV. 223 (1981) and "Tastes Great, Less Filling": The Law School
Clinic and Political Critique, 35 J. LEGAL EDUC. 45 (1986) (challenging clinical

teaching methods as being prone to authoritarianism, and clinical critique of
performance as being inadequate due to faculty disinterest in, or lack of
capacity to critique, and faculty members' desires to shield their lawyering
decisions from criticism). For replies to Condlin's articles, see generally
Norman Redlich, The Moral Value of ClinicalLegal Education:A Reply, 33 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 613 (1983) and Kenny Hegland, Condlin's Critique of
Conventional Clinics: The Case of the Missing Case, 36 J. LEGAL EDUC. 427

(1986).
26. Since 1983 that component has featured a three week intensive
exposure to five broad substantive areas, plus simulation skills sessions in
interviewing, counseling, negotiation and motions practice. During that time,
students spend their time with our 600-page student manual, and, with few
exceptions, do not meet or represent clients. The substantive areas are public
entitlements (welfare, food stamps and home heating), family law (divorce,
separation and child support), juvenile, landlord-tenant and public utilities,
and disability-based entitlements (including Social Security disability
insurance, Supplemental Security income and Medicaid). There are also
classes on law office management, case preparation, discovery and state court

practice. Our office routinely provides representation in bankruptcy, veterans
benefits and consumer matters, but training in these is done on a case-by-case

basis with the individual student responsible for the case.

The John MarshallLaw Review

[32:87

maximize their chances of participating in other curricular options
(including limited enrollment courses tested on the bar exam).
Thus, with both attorney and student time increasingly
constrained, our future will remain firmly tied to a traditional
service caseload, out of which must come whatever impact/law
reform/extra difficult (or "hard") cases we will do.
C. Even Administrative Law Cases of the Repetitive, ServiceOriented Type Can Constitute Sufficiently Difficult Material to
Challenge Students and Faculty Alike, and Yield Valuable Lessons
Administrative law cases afford clinics ample opportunities to
meet many of the goals of clinical legal education; criticism of
them stems largely from the fact that at hearings, the rules of
evidence are often not strictly followed, and there is no opposing
counsel.17 These are obviously serious drawbacks, and dictate that
however good the case may be, a student assigned such a case
should have, as a counterbalance, a caseload that includes other
matters involving either or both of the missing elements. But the
criticism does not compel the conclusion that administrative cases
have low value as teaching vehicles. During the course of a term,
they afford clinical students ample opportunity to exercise
considerable responsibility for advancing the matter both factually
and legally. Clients and witnesses may be interviewed, facts
investigated, witnesses (including experts) consulted, hearings
prepared and conducted, appeals perfected, and the like.
Supposedly non-adversarial proceedings can be remarkably
adversarial when the hearing officer assumes, consciously or not,
the role of adversary or even antagonist. Some hearings (welfare,
for instance) are adversarial, with the state agency represented by
an assistant attorney general. Many administrative cases do not
wrap up in a semester, and can take on complex characteristics.
Ethical issues predictably arise and must be resolved. Within
almost any area of administrative law, systemic abuses may be
observed, leading to civil litigation, and perhaps class actions, in
state or federal court. This has been my experience in state
administrative
hearings
involving,
in
turn,
vocational
rehabilitation and ANFC, resulting in three pieces of impact
litigation, two of them class actions in federal court. A federal
administrative hearing likewise evolved into a significant federal
class action. This is not to say that all administrative matters are
tough cases; we know they are not. Nor is it to say that every class
action is a good teaching vehicle. But a balanced caseload can
produce balanced learning experiences of all types, among the
most valuable of which is exposure to living human beings, their
problems, hopes and fears, their cultures, and their needs. And
27. See Reingold, supra note 1, at 549, 553-54.

1998]

Hard Cases From Easy Cases Grow

while becoming sensitive to these, the student must learn to
marshall facts, a theory of the case, and compelling legal
argument, sometimes in areas in which the law, or proof
requirements, are not clear. It was in this context that my clinic
found representation of a military veteran (and, later, his widow),
and the former fiancee of another such veteran, to be both
professionally and personally rewarding, as well as challenging.
In many, if not all, respects, they were "hard" cases.
IV. STUDIES OF TWO VETERANS' CASES AS CHALLENGING
ADMINISTRATiVE LAW CASES

A. Nelson K
1.

The Case

In late autumn 1990, Nelson K 8 came to our clinic to get help
re-filing an application for service-connected disability (and
related health care) benefits, based upon a back injury. Records
he brought with him showed that on October 13, 1966, at age 17,
he had enlisted in the Army for three years but was honorably
discharged early, on January 31, 1969, to reenlist for six
additional years. He never finished that second service, as he
requested discharge "for the good of the service," in lieu of trial by
court martial; his discharge, effective March 24, 1971, was under
"other than honorable conditions." In February 1979, the VA had
determined that the character of this March 1971 discharge
constituted a bar to award of VA benefits, based on findings that K
had been absent without leave (AWOL) for a continuous period in
excess of 180 days during the second enlistment, and his first
obligated period of service was not considered "faithful and
meritorious." He never appealed that decision.
During the course of the interview, as we learned more of his
life, it appeared that Nelson might be suffering from posttraumatic stress disorder, or PTSD. He had served in Vietnam for
a year, November 1967 to November 1968, primarily with the
Headquarters Company, 15th Engineer Battalion, 9th Infantry
Division, in the Mekong Delta region, and had had a number of
combat experiences. His life in the military came to be
characterized by alcohol and drug use. His life after the military
was characterized by substance abuse, a chaotic personal life,
several suicide attempts, and finally a conviction for second degree
murder. When we saw him, he was free on parole, and beginning
28. In the following accounts, the names of the veterans and their family
members have been changed for the sake of privacy. Substantiating materials
for both cases are on file at the Sout Royalton Legal Clinic as part of the
clients' confidential case files.
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to put his life back together. The interview was memorable. K
told us that when he first arrived in Vietnam he was diverted from
his specialty, wheeled and tracked vehicle repair, into a combat
infantry assignment with the "flame platoon," which, using flame
throwers and other weapons, set up safe perimeters for other
units. Two months later, and for the next six months after that,
he served in the Mekong Delta primarily with the "Riverines"
aboard a unique type of small, highly maneuverable U.S. Navy
vessel. In that capacity he was a machine gunner on a tracked
vehicle that, mounted inside such a boat, primarily served as a
flame thrower. Operating in concert with similar vessels and
larger mother ships, the small boats provided support to combat
operations and were frequently fired upon. They, in turn, could
select targets along the riverbank, and did so. While describing
some of the unit's encounters, K became visibly emotionally upset.
The interview presented us with challenging proof problems.
First, K's service record (DA 20, Enlisted Qualifications Record)
showed that his military occupational specialties (or MOS) were
"Wheeled Vehicle Mechanic," "Track Vehicle Mechanic," "General
Vehicle Repairman," and "Wheeled Vehicle Repairman." There
was no mention of service with a "flame platoon," on the river, on
Navy vessels or with the Riverines. Nor was there any indication
of precisely where he was posted. Second, his memory of precisely
where the vessels operated was spotty. He was able to recall that
the radio code for his vessel was either "Flame" or "Zippo 1" (or
perhaps both at different times) and that they called a part of the
river system where they sometimes operated "Snoopy's Nose,"
presumably because of the shape of the shoreline. Finally, he had
not had any psychiatric or related treatment during his military
service, nor could he recall, with one exception, any significant
physical treatment, other than occasional visits to doctors for pain
relief, given at the time of, or after, his back injury. He did recall
being slightly wounded in the back of both legs with shrapnel in
the spring of 1968, but said he was treated on a ship and released
the same day; his medical records did not reflect this episode. We
left further exploration of his experiences on the river to later
interviews.
Two students, one a full-time clinician, the other part-time,
had been assigned to this interview. They quickly undertook to
divide up the tasks to be done by way of gathering basic evidence,
while simultaneously learning about service-connected disability
benefits,29 and PTSD3 ° (which K, now our client, had authorized us
29. Service-connected disability benefits are paid to veterans who can show
that a disability was incurred in or aggravated by service. 38 U.S.C. § 1110
(1994); 38 C.F.R. § 3.303 (1997). [Note: Unless otherwise indicated, all

citations are to current statutes and regulations which were also in effect at
the time this case was being developed]. A "veteran" is a "person who served
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in the active military, naval, or air service, and who was discharged or
released therefrom under conditions other than dishonorable." 38 U.S.C §
101(2) (1998). Discharge or release includes:
... retirement

from active service ...

the satisfactory completion of the

period of active service ... for which a person was obligated at the time
of entry into such service in the case of a person who, due to enlistment
or reenlistment, was not awarded a discharge or release from such
period of service at the time of such completion thereof and who, at such
time, would otherwise have been eligible for the award of a discharge or
release under conditions other than dishonorable.
38 U.S.C. § 101(18) (1998). A discharge to reenlist is a "conditional discharge,"
if issued during the Vietnam era. 38 C.F.R. § 3.13(a)(2) (1998).
30. Post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) was characterized as an anxiety
disorder by the Diagnosticand Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 235 (3d
ed. 1987) (DSM-III-R), in effect at the time of our initial client interview.
According to DSM-III-R:
the essential feature of this disorder is the development of characteristic
symptoms following a psychologically distressing event that is outside
the range of usual human experience. The stressor producing this
syndrome would be markedly distressing to almost anyone, and is
usually experienced with intense fear, terror, and helplessness. The
characteristic symptoms involve reexperiencing the traumatic event,
avoidance of stimuli associated with the event or numbing of general
responsiveness, and increased arousal.
Id. at 247.
The current edition of the DSM, DSM-IV, changed the criteria for
establishing the existence of a stressor, by eliminating DSM-III-R's
requirement that the experienced event be "outside the range of usual human
experience and.., be markedly distressing to almost anyone." Diagnosticand
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 427 (4th ed. 1994) [hereinafter DSMV]. The new criteria, adopted by the VA in November 1996, are more
subjective and in effect recognize that "[an event] may be traumatic to one
person but not to another." National Veterans Legal Services Program
(NVLSP), The New Guide to PTSD Claims, 8 VETERANS ADVOCATE, 89 (MayJune 1997). To establish a stressor now, one must show that "(1) the person
experienced, witnessed, or was confronted with an event or events that
involved actual or threatened death or serious injury, or a threat to the
physical integrity of self or others, [and] (2) the person's response involved
intense fear, helplessness or horror."
DSM-IV, supra at 427-28.
VA
regulations include PTSD within the Schedule for Disabilities at 38 C.F.R. §
4.130 Diagnostic Code (DC) 9411 (1997). 38 C.F.R. § 3.304 (f) requires, for
establishment of service connection for PTSD, "medical evidence establishing a
clear diagnosis of the condition, credible supporting evidence that the claimed
inservice stressor actually occurred, and a link, established by medical
evidence, between current symptomology and the claimed inservice stressor."
38 C.F.R. § 3.304(f) (1998).
Detailed regulations governing proof requirements for PTSD are found in
the VA ADJUDICATION PROCEDURE MANUAL M21-1. The section governing

PTSD, formerly designated as section 50.45e, had required that service
records support the veteran's assertion of exposure to a stressor, but it was
amended during the course of our case on March 26, 1991 (VA Interim Issue
21-91-1) to conform with recently amended statutory and regulatory
provisions. VA ADJUDICATION PROCEDURE MANUAL M21-1 § 50.45e (1989).

The new section 50.45e read: "If the evidence shows the veteran engaged in
combat with the enemy and the claimed stressor is related to combat, no
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to investigate). In doing this, they had one advantage: our clinic
had, the previous spring, completed representation in another
VA/PTSD case, so we had some institutional memory of useful
approaches to adopt. That case, Mark R, is described below at
pages 120-26.
2.

Fact Gatheringand Theory Development

In short order the students 31 began to sharpen their
knowledge of the VA benefits system, primarily with the help of
substantive VA resource materials published by the Vietnam
Veterans of America (VVA) and the National Veterans Legal
Services Program (NVLSP). They also had what we termed "The
Red Book" (based on the color of its cover at the time) available to
them. This is a publication prepared by the U.S. Army and Joint
Services Environmental Support Group (ESG) describing how
personal military records can be obtained and used to prove PTSD
claims.3
Through careful reading, much correspondence
and
substantial followup on leads, by May 1991 the clinicians had
formulated a basic theory of the case (probable PTSD, possibly
able to be proved, and a back injury, said to be congenital in the
service records, difficult to prove and of uncertain severity) and
gathered a substantial number of military service and medical
records. The first goal was to determine whether or not a serviceconnected disability existed. This would involve discovering and
developing medical evidence of K's former and current mental
states for the PTSD claim, evidence of combat experience, and any

further

development

for

evidence

of a

stressor

is

necessary."

VA

§ 50.45e as amended (Feb. 13,
1997). Section 50.45e has been redesignated and is now located at M21-1, Part
VI, para. 11.38 (Feb. 13, 1997). This paragraph no longer includes the quoted
language of para. 50.45e, but maintains the same approach. Id. Although the
ADJUDICATION PROCEDURE MANUAL M21-1,

amendment helped us at the time in making proof, it did not solve our

problems, since his official individual service records did not explicitly show
that K had engaged in combat. See also 38 U.S.C. §§ 1154(b), 3.304(d) (1998).
31. Betty Chalifoux and Colleen Stiger worked into January 1991, when

Christian Root took over the case for the spring term.
32. The VVA book was KEITH D. SNYDER ET AL., GUIDE TO VETERANS
BENEFITS (REV. ED. 1985). Over the next year, our students quickly moved
from these materials to NVLSP's comprehensive two-volume (now with a
1992-93 Supplement) publication, M. WILDHABER ET AL., VETERANS BENEFITS
MANUAL: AN ADVOCATE'S GUIDE TO REPRESENTING VETERANS AND THEIR
DEPENDENTS (1991). They also used VETERANS EDUCATION PROJECT ET AL.,

THE VETERAN'S SELF-HELP GUIDE TO DISCHARGE UPGRADING (1990).
33. U.S. ARMY AND JOINT SERVICES ENVIRONMENTAL SUPPORT GROUP

(ESG),

GUIDE FOR THE PREPARATION AND SUBMISSION OF POST TRAUMATIC

(3d ed. 1996). The ESG is now known
as the U.S. Armed Services Center for Research of Unit Records, and is located
STRESS DISORDER RESEARCH REQUESTS

in Springfield, VA.
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useful information on the back claim. Assuming the existence of a
service-connected disability, we would look at separating the two
periods of service to see if benefits could be payable under either
the first period of enlistment, for which we would need to show
"honest, faithful and meritorious" service, or under the second
period of service, for which we would need to show a "compelling
circumstances" exception to the bar on benefits for 180 days
AWOL.34
As we came to know our client and his facts, the PTSD claim
loomed larger, and the back impairment, although supported by
some evidence, receded in importance. Proof of combat experience
was essential to establishing not only the PTSD impairment, but
also our defenses to the bars to benefits. Our first step toward
proving this came in a letter from the U.S. Army Military History
Institute, Carlisle, Pennsylvania, which said that while it had no
published histories of the 15th Engineer Battalion, it did have a
unit history published in a secondary source called Vietnam Order
of Battle; an enclosed page from that book stated that the 15th
Engineers were part of the 9th Infantry Division, and that parts of
the 15th "became specialized in Riverine operations required by
the 2d Brigade's unique Vietnam mission."35 Also enclosed were
bibliographies of the 9th Infantry Division (16 items) and
"Riverine Warfare, Vietnam" (31 items). We ordered copies of
what looked helpful.
The next response gave us less cause for hope, and
highlighted the evidentiary bind our client was in. The U.S. Naval
Historical Center indicated that it had histories and deck logs of
commissioned U.S. Navy ships only, and this did not include any
landing craft or river patrol units that operated with the Mobile
Riverine Forces (MRF) in Vietnam. The letter added: "It [K's
craft] may well have been a US Army craft since Mr. [K] was a
member of the US Army."3 6 However, the author did give the
valuable tip that the U.S. Army Center of Military History,
34. 38 C.F.R. § 3.12(c)(6) (1998). This section also provides that the bar
will not apply "if there are compelling circumstances to warrant the prolonged
unauthorized absence." Id. Factors to be considered include length and
character of service exclusive of the AWOL period, the reasons for going
AWOL, and existence of a valid legal defense for the absence which would
have precluded a conviction for AWOL. Id. The 1979 VA decision in fact
appeared to have separated the two periods of service, finding the second
period barred by the 180 day AWOL provision, and the first barred by 38
C.F.R. § 3.12(d)(4), which provides that a discharge for willful and persistent
misconduct is a bar to benefits. 38 U.S.C. § 3.12(d)(4) (1998). That section
goes on to say, however, that "a discharge because of a minor offense will not,
however, be considered willful and persistent misconduct if service was
otherwise honest, faithful and meritorious." Id.
35. SHELBY L. STANTON, VIETNAM ORDER OF BATTLE 170 (1981).

36. Letter from Dep't of the Navy 1 (Apr. 19, 1991) (on file with The South
Royalton Legal Clinic).
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Washington, D.C., might be of assistance.
Then, our first major break occurred. In early May 1991 a
librarian at the National Archives, Kathryn Jacob, wrote that she
had located 12,500 pages of records dealing with the 15th
Engineer Battalion. 7 More important, she recommended two
books which she thought "might be helpful." One of them, she
said, was Seven Firefights in Vietnam, which "contains a chapter
on 'Fight #4: The Fight Along the Rach Ba Rai,' also known as the
'Battle of Snoopy's Nose.'
The chapter contains maps,
illustrations, and photographs of ships used on the river and
references to the 'Riverines.' 8 We ordered the books, and over the
summer of 1991 retained the services of Robert Pommer, a
Catholic University law student affiliated with Columbus
Community Legal Services in Washington, D.C., to go to the
National Archives and copy what was useful on the 15th
Engineers. His work yielded documentary proof that elements of
the 2d Brigade, 9th Infantry were attached to the U.S.S. Benewah
(later established to be a Riverine "mother ship") and engaged in
frequent combat with Viet Cong forces. 9 Journal entries of
January and February 1968 (the time of the Tet Offensive)4 ° for
the 15th Engineers likewise showed frequent contact with Viet
Cong forces and referred to the "flame section," "flame tracks," "six
boats," "Mobile Riverine Force" and "everyone playing infantry."
Although K's name did not appear in any journal entries, few
names did, and our circumstantial case slowly grew stronger.
With our client's approval, we decided to gather as much
evidence as possible before seeking to reopen his application. Over
the next eighteen months we absorbed the records that began to
come in, pursued new leads, and undertook to figure out how to
use the information we did have to generate new information and
usable evidence. A particularly useful piece of information we
37. Letter from Kathryn Jacob, Suitland Reference Branch, National
Archives (May 6, 1991) (on file with The South Royalton Legal Clinic).
38. Jacob, supra note 37. The book referred to is J. ALBRIGHT ET AL., SEVEN
FIREFIGHTS IN VIETNAM (1970). The other book was W. FULTON, VIETNAM
STUDIES: RIVERINE OPERATIONS 1966-1969 (1970). It contains photos and
maps with references to "Snoopy's Nose."
39. The U.S.S. Benewah's journal of contact with Viet Cong forces for just
one day, May 8, 1968, is eight single-spaced pages long, and concludes with
references to ambushes of "monitors" (Riverine vessels) and an "ATC flame
thrower," resulting in 10 U.S. WIAs.

40. The Tet Offensive was a surprise attack throughout South Vietnam by
84,000 National Liberation Front (NLF) and North Vietnamese Army (NVA)
troops, launched on the Vietnamese New Year, the night January 30-31, 1968.

ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE VIETNAM WAR 536-41 (Stanley I. Kutler ed., 1996).
Designed to regain the initiative in the war, the attacks, which lasted for a
week in Saigon to early March in Hue, were a military failure for the NLF and

NVA, but began the process of changing American public opinion on the war,
resulting in eventual U.S. withdrawal. Id.
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received (from the Center of Military History) was a list of the
commanders of the Riverine infantry battalions during the period
at issue. We found their current addresses, wrote to several, and
one responded; he would later supply us with authoritative
information on the structure of the 15th Engineer Battalion.
During this time we also filed a court action to gain access to K's
state prison medical records, and reviewed them; reviewed new
medical evidence from the state mental hospital; and concluded a
series of probing interviews of our client, and began to distill his
story into affidavit form. We also pursued leads to identify
witnesses to our client's behavior before, during and after military
service; to get whatever information we could from the U.S. Navy
to substantiate K's story, and to identify a competent psychiatrist
to meet our client and render a diagnosis of his past and present
mental conditions.
In the spring of 1993 we re-applied for VA benefits, and also
filed applications for discharge recharacterization with the Army
Board for Correction of Military Records (ABCMR)41 and Army
Discharge Review Board (ADRB); 2 each application was supported
by new evidence 3 and a memorandum, and each application was
rejected. The VA decision did not discuss the new evidence in any
detail (it did not even mention the new psychiatrist's opinion or
probative x-ray report), characterized the rest of the evidence
submitted as redundant or mere statements, and concluded that
the bar to benefits remained in place." We appealed the VA
41. See 10 U.S.C. § 1552 (1998) and 32 C.F.R. § 581.3 (1998).
42. See 10 U.S.C. § 1553 (1998) and 32 C.F.R. § 581.2 (1998).
43. The best of the new evidence was a recent report from Ronald L. Green,
M.D., a psychiatrist from Dartmouth-Hitchcock Medical Center, stating that
during and since the military, K had shown numerous signs and symptoms of
PTSD. A second piece of new evidence was a recent x-ray report indicating
that there was a metallic foreign body, irregular in shape, located in K's right
thigh, and that it "has the appearance of being a piece of shrapnel." It was
also noted on another view of both upper femurs that K had multiple metallic
foreign bodies, "one of them shaped as a pin and the other one shaped as
clips." However, because there was no irregularity in shape or deformity to
these pieces (as opposed to the first piece, which was irregular), the
roentgenologist was unwilling to certify that they were shrapnel. In an
interview with us, K had said that he thought that the B-40 rockets were
Russian-made and may well have contained pin-shaped shrapnel, based upon
remnants he had found after rocket attacks.
44. The negative decision of the ABCMR was grounded on the veteran's
failure to apply for relief within three years of his date of discharge, pursuant
to 10 U.S.C. § 1552(b) (1993); the Board could have waived the three year
limit if it found it "in the interest of justice" to so decide, but was unwilling to
do so. Letter from David R. Kinneer, Executive Secretary, Dep't of the Army,
ADRB 2 (Sept. 24, 1993) (on file with The South Royalton Legal Clinic). The
decision of the ADRB was based upon the veteran's separation over fifteen
years prior to the filing of his request for review. Id. See 10 U.S.C. § 1553(a)
(1998).
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denial.
Summer 1993 brought terrible news: K was diagnosed with
lung cancer. He commenced treatment at a private hospital, as
VA medical care was still denied him.
We prepared for his appeal hearing by interviewing relatives,
drafting affidavits, classifying new information on the Riverines,
and scheduling a new consultation with Dr. Green, the
psychiatrist. We supplied him with all of the evidence we had
amassed to date, so that he could compare it with his patient's
account of his life. Our letter to him of February 7, 199441 was an
admirable piece of student work, reciting our involvement with
him to date (and enclosing copies of all prior correspondence with
prior enclosures); briefly outlining the theory of the case and its
procedural posture, and enclosing three affidavits of our client and
family members; eight articles establishing that elements of the
15th Engineers were assigned in support of the Mobile Riverine
Force and saw substantial battle, and ships' histories (with daily
logs) of the U.S.S. Benewah and U.S.S. Colleton which, based on
the eight articles and their own logs, were shown to have been
"mother ships" to the small Riverine vessels. We asked that he
first review all the material, then see K again, and later answer
interrogatories from us. Finally, we pursued developing a new
legal theory: that in addition to (or as part of) PTSD, K had
suffered from "insanity"46 as defined in the VA regulations, during
his service and thereafter, and therefore was not subject to the bar
on benefits.
At hearing in April on K's renewed request to reopen his
claim, a report and interrogatory responses from the psychiatrist
firmly established that K's family background included factors
that would make him vulnerable to PTSD; that he had suffered

45. Letter from David Royer, Student Intern, South Royalton Legal Clinic 1

(Feb. 10, 1994) (on file with South Royalton Legal Clinic). David Royer, who
wrote it, also did a fine job of organizing and correlating the very substantial
amount of evidence we had received to date. He would go on to represent K at
his April 1994 appeal hearing, and present new evidence which he had helped
to develop. David's work built upon all the prior work done by clinicians since
May 1991: Jennings Cantrell, David Venman, Rob Honigman, Rachel
Houseman, and Gerry Tallman.

46. An insane person is:
one who ... exhibits, due to disease, a more or less prolonged deviation
from his normal method of behavior; or who interferes with the peace of
society; or who has so departed (become antisocial) from the accepted
standards of the community to which by birth and education he belongs
as to lack the adaptability to make further adjustment to the social

customs of the community in which he resides.
38 C.F.R. § 3.354(a) (1998). The bars to benefits recited in the character of

discharge regulations do not apply if "it is found that the person was insane at
the time of committing the offense causing such discharge." 38 C.F.R. §
3.12(b) (1998).
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from combat-induced PTSD, and that it was highly likely that his
PTSD both caused his AWOL behavior and also rendered him
"insane" as defined in the regulations. An affidavit from K's sister,
Linda, indicated that their father deserted the family when Nelson
was three years old. Their mother worked and raised the family,
but they never had much money. Before entering the military,
Nelson was involved in some petty thefts, and was sent to "some
kind of religious camp or school" in Vermont. He then took the
family car and wrecked it, and was given the choice by a judge of
going to jail or joining the Army. When Nelson got back from
military service, he "was really wacky." She said she remembered
particularly the times he spoke of a soldier who was standing right
next to him being blown apart by enemy fire. After his return,
Nelson was not functional, drank heavily and had no job skills. He
told his sister of his belief that he could separate his mind from his
body. After their mother died, Nelson lived with Linda. He was
drinking heavily, and owned several guns. He would at times hide
on the porch and scream, "Incoming!" and throw himself behind
couches, or onto the floor. At other times he would hide behind
furniture, and became obsessed with the shrapnel remaining in
his body. He became deranged and violent at this time, and
stopped talking about Vietnam. At this point Linda and others
were afraid of Nelson, especially when he was drunk or drinking.
He was violent and frightening, and a "lost soul." Private medical
records showed two suicide attempts in the military, and two after
discharge.
Military medical and discharge records showed
"attempted suicide" while in the military. Although the existence
of "identifying body marks, scars, tattoos," "nervous trouble,"
"depression or excessive worry," and "frequent trouble sleeping,"
were not noted on the induction physical examination form (SF88), nevertheless, the person completing the discharge medical
examination form listed all these as "lifetime problems," without
explanation.
K's story was put into evidence by way of both affidavit and
direct testimony. He said that one to two weeks after his arrival
in Vietnam in October, 1967 he "was assigned to a position in the
field with the flame platoon." Initially he "served as a gunner on a
three-quarter ton truck with a... machine gun mounted on the
back." Later he served as a driver/gunner on a track-mounted
flame thrower. His unit "set up security perimeters for other units
so they could 'dig in."' On one occasion that month he was working
on a road between "Rubber Arm's House," a name given by the
soldiers to a particular location on the road, and "Bearcat," the
American base, working on a mine sweeping operation. A twoand-a-half ton truck carrying two ARVN (Army of South Vietnam)
soldiers came toward them. His group signaled them to stop,
which they did; when the two ARVN soldiers got out of the truck, a
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mine exploded under them, killing one and injuring one. K drove
the injured man to a field hospital. In January 1968, a U.S. Army
officer was killed and his driver wounded in an ambush. K's flame
platoon was sent to secure the area. Upon arriving at the scene,
he fired his machine gun into the area where the Viet Cong were
suspected to have been. A three-quarter ton escort truck was also
there, and the gunner on it began firing in the direction of vendors
along the road, among whom were women and children. K "saw
two women drop behind a bank, but [he] did not know if they were
hit by, or dodging, bullets." Later that month he was assigned to
the Riverine Force; he was a machine gunner on a tracked-vehicle
flamethrower on a vessel (which, we asserted at a later hearing,
operated often in the "Snoopy's Nose" area). On the river, he
experienced about thirty firefights in which no one was injured or
killed, but several others in which they were. On one occasion a
boat near his was hit by a B-40 rocket; as he understood it, the
boat captain was killed. On another occasion, he "saw a sailor who
had lost an arm... being taken off a boat." He recalled that
during one mission in 'or about April 1968, "[his] boat began taking
enemy fire ... As [it headed to shore], a sailor returned fire with
an M-79 grenade launcher. The grenade [apparently] struck an
[overhead] tree limb and exploded." The sailor, about 10 feet
away, was hit in the throat by shrapnel, bled profusely and was
evacuated. On yet another occasion (he recalled it being in April
or May, 1968) several boats came under B-40 rocket attack. When
it was over, one man lay dead, another was injured, and K had
shrapnel wounds in the backs of both legs. He assisted with some
difficulty in helping to offload the body of the casualty. K
succeeded in getting medical help to remove most, but not all, of
the shrapnel from his body. On another occasion (he recalled it as
being during the Tet Offensive) K was hurried off the river to
Saigon to be positioned at a machine gun emplacement at one end
of the "Y" bridge.
In July 1968, he left the Riverines after a transfer to the
264th Transportation Company and was shifted to a post further
north. Soon thereafter, while on convoy duty with a ten to twenty
vehicle column, they came upon a serious traffic accident involving
two civilian trucks and a track vehicle. The trucks were in flames,
and K and two others were told to "clean it up." They pulled the
body of a badly burned child from the truck and left at least one
body in the truck. The child, still alive, was placed by the side of
the road in the care of nearby civilians. On another occasion,
during convoy duty, his column became involved in a small fire
fight in which a pregnant civilian was wounded in the stomach by
shrapnel. She walked up to K's track, pulled up her dress and
showed him the hole in her stomach.
As a result of his combat experiences, K began using drugs to
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handle the psychological effects of combat. While on the river, he
used them sparingly, because he felt he needed all his faculties to
stay alive. Later, however, with the Transportation Company, he
felt the danger was less, and began smoking opium and taking
speed and downers. Upon returning to the United States, he felt
that he was a completely different person from who he had been,
and began to use alcohol. He reenlisted, went AWOL, and was
eventually discharged. He found that he was unable to develop
relationships with others, hold a job or function normally in daily
life. He began to relive some of the combat experiences, had
trouble sleeping and experienced unexplained outbursts of anger,
particularly toward family members. He became suicidal, and
tried three times to kill himself, once by slashing his neck (in
1974), and on two other occasions by driving his car into solid
objects. In 1982, he was convicted of second degree murder for a
crime committed when he had been drinking. (Other evidence
showed that on two occasions between his discharge and 1982
conviction, he had stabbed a person, both events occurring when
he was startled by the unexpected arrival of someone he didn't
like).
At the hearing, K described how, in his view, he came to have
trouble dealing with people:
[P]rior to my transfer up north into this moving company they had
me with I was in daily combat, and never really had a chance to
think much about what I was doing, who I was doing it to, or who I
[was] doing it with, or anything else. It was just a do it type of a
situation. Do it or die. Then when I got up north it was a whole
different set of circumstances where we are in a presumably sa[fle
situation, and they wanted us to be friendly with the villagers and
the people around, you know, to interact with the[m] socially. I
found that very difficult if not impossible to do because what
happened was that while I was down in the south I had to take the
opinion or the position that those villagers and their property and
possessions and everything else that they didn't have any value.
That was the only way that I could function there was that those
people and their property had no value, and then I get up north and
they start trying to drill into me that these people have value, and I
couldn't accept that because if the people up north had value then
that meant that the people down south had value, and that meant
that what I had done, excuse me (crying), what I had done down
south was really wrong. So, I tried to block it out with the use of
drugs, more alcohol, and sometimes in behavior. I carried that with
me back to the States with my use of terpine (sic) alcohol, and even
behavior. I just couldn't accept the people, even later when I was
married and had a child of my own. I don't think I ever really
accepted that they had value, nor could I love them, because to place
that kind of value on anybody would again revert back to that first
eight months in Vietnam where people couldn't have value, or what
I was doing was wrong. That's where I think I got a lot of my
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opinions that I carried through most of my life from that period of
47
time. That's all I have to say.
Offered in support of K's testimony were all the literature and
records shown to Dr. Green, including a letter from the retired
U.S. Army colonel who commanded the 15th Engineer Battalion
during K's service with it in Vietnam. He was of the opinion that
if K's records showed that he served with "HHC" of the 15th, he
did not doubt that K had experienced the incidents he reported.
The author of a now-declassified Army War College Case Study
about Riverine operations for 1966-1970, the Colonel indicated
that typical encounters on the waterways "were often extremely
violent and short-lived. RPG's [rocket-propelled grenades],
Claymores [mines], grenades and [alutomatic weapons fire could
erupt from concealed positions along the waterways completely
without warning. If the VC [Viet Cong] wanted to stay a fight, or
were cornered, quite a vicious battle could develop."48
The student clinician, David Royer, argued that the law no
longer required independent evidence in official military records of
occurrence of a particular stressor;49 that lay evidence alone was

47. Transcript of hearing, April 13, 1994, 14. In response to the hearing
officer's question about what caused his AWOL period from March to
December 1970, K said, "It was just everything. I didn't want to play
anymore.... I just didn't want to be there anymore. So, I left." Id. at 20. He
further testified that after turning himself in and being sent to Fort Devens,
he developed the belief that he could separate his mind from his body, and
shared this belief with a psychiatrist. Id. at 16. His discharge followed
shortly thereafter. Id.
48. Letter from Thomas C. Loper, Colonel, U.S. Army (Ret.) 1 (Feb. 17,
1994) (on file with the South Royalton Legal Clinic). The literature submitted
at hearing did not specifically refer to K by name, but did establish that
elements of the 15th Engr. Bn. 9th Inf. Div. USARPAC, and in particular,
HHC (Headquarters, Headquarters Company), were assigned in support of the
Mobile Riverine operations and saw substantial combat action in the Mekong
Delta region during K's service in Vietnam. Considered together, the ships'
histories, the colonel's letter, K's testimony, and K's discharge records (which
did indicate cryptically that he participated in Vietnam Counteroffensives PH
III, IV and V, and PH Tet, and was awarded the Vietnam Service Medal and
Vietnam Campaign Medal), would allow inferences to be fairly drawn that he
was present at the site of combat and had experienced combat. In addition to
the military records reciting the history of the 15th Engineer Battalion and
the book by Stanton, supra note 35, the materials included such titles as:
Round Two for the Ironclads, ARMY DIG. Jan. 1968, Maj. R. Funderbunk,
Warfare in the Delta, INFANTRY, Mar.-Apr. 1968, at 41-42; LT. GEN. J. HAY,
JR., VIETNAM STUDIES: TACTICAL AND MATERIAL INNOVATIONS 66-77 (1974);
and R. Weaver, Jr., The Second Mobile Riverine Force:A Page from History,
XII JOURNAL OF THE COUNCIL ON ABANDONED MILITARY POSTS, Jan. 1981, at

3-10. The study written by Col. Loper was entitled The Mobile Riverine Force,
or The Marriage of the Brown Water Navy and the Rice Paddy Army, U.S.
Army War College, (1970). It was submitted into evidence at a later hearing.
49. VA ADJUDICATION PROCEDURE MANUAL M21-1, § 50.45e as amended,
supra note 30 and Wood v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 406 (1991) (Steinberg, J.,
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'
sufficient to establish that the veteran engaged in combat;50
that
the VA cannot use unsubstantiated medical opinions to refute an
expert opinion of the type we had offered, 5 and that a serviceconnected disability can be established even though the claimed
condition was not diagnosed in the service or for many years after
service.5 2 On the issue of the 180-day AWOL bar, he argued that
the initial enlistment should be considered separately from the
second,53 and, considered on its own merits, the first enlistment
was not subject to the bar because K did not amass 180 days of
AWOL during the first three years of service. Nor was the first
period disqualified due to "willful and persistent misconduct"
because his AWOL time was insignificant during the first three
years.' As to the second period of service, which did have well over
180 days of AWOL, Royer argued that while the bar did apply,
there were "compelling circumstances," as defined in the
regulations, to allow the bar to be lifted. (This argument, our
weakest in terms of the kinds of proof required by the regulations,
was made only in a memorandum of law). Finally, he argued that
all the evidence, including the medical evidence, established that
K was insane at the time he committed the offense causing his
discharge, and the bar to benefits therefore should be removed.
In his July 1994 decision, the VA senior claims analyst ruled
that the first period of service was under dishonorable conditions
for VA purposes, and in any event was not faithful and
meritorious; the second period was barred by the 180-day AWOL
rule, without evidence of compelling circumstances to overcome it;
and there was no evidence of combat experience. The decision did
not state whether or not any service-connected disability existed.

dissenting).
50. See Tryteck v. Derwinski, 3 Vet. App. 153 (1992).
51. Id.
52. See Cosman v. Principi, 3 Vet. App. 503 (1992) and 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(d).
See also Caluza v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 498 (1995), affd 78 F.3d 604 (Fed.Cir.
1996), reh'g den. (1996).
53. We argued that K's first enlistment should be considered separately
because it was controlled by 38 C.F.R. § 3.13, which provides that a discharge
to reenlist is conditional if issued during the Vietnam era, but even where
such a discharge occurs, it will be considered unconditional if (1) the person
served for the period of time obligated at the time of entry; (2) "the person was
not discharged ... at the time of completing [the first obligated period] due to
an intervening ...reenlistment," and (3) "the person would have been eligible
for a discharge ... under conditions other than dishonorable [then] except for
the intervening ...reenlistment." 38 C.F.R. § 3.13(c ) (1998).
54. We relied upon Winter v. Principi, in which the court held that a
serviceman's AWOL offenses were persistent misconduct because they
amounted to 18% of his service time. Winter v. Principi, 4 Vet. App. 29, 32
(1993). By contrast, K's AWOL time in his first three year obligated period
was only 5.3%, all of the lost time coming after a year of faithful and
meritorious service in Vietnam.
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It did not mention the new medical evidence or any of the evidence
showing combat experience of the 15th Engineer Battalion, nor did
it address the insanity argument.5
K's physical condition rapidly worsened during the summer of
1994, as the cancer spread from his lungs to the spine and brain.
By early October we were able to establish a service-connected
disability of cancer based upon presumptive herbicide (Agent
Orange) exposure" and the VA awarded medical care benefits
solely for treatment of lung cancer. K was too ill to attend his VA
appeal hearing that month, so a clinic attorney and student, Eric
Lopez, appeared alone on his behalf. The hearing officer affirmed
the prior denials. In December, K died. His widow, Anna, had
energetically assisted him in all phases of his life since their
marriage during his incarceration (she was a health care worker
in the prison), and she vowed to carry on his case. We filed an
application for accrued benefits, 7 Dependency and Indemnity
Compensation (DIC), 8 Dependents' Educational Assistance, 59 and
burial benefits" on behalf of her and their child. A claim was also

55. The decision maker did rule that pursuant to 38 U.S.C. §. 17 the
claimant was eligible for medical benefits based upon the first full period of
service (1966-1969) "for any disability determined to be service connected" but
made no ruling on whether such a disability existed. A Statement of the Case
prepared in September 1994 addressed our August 1994 Notice of
Disagreement contentions, but concluded that "the record contains absolutely
nothing from a psychiatric standpoint," again ignoring Dr. Green's letter and
interrogatory answers.
56. See Diseases Associated With Exposure to Certain Herbicide Agents
(Multiple Myeloma and Respiratory Cancers) 59 Fed. Reg. 29,723 (1994) (to be
codified at 38 C.F.R. pt. 3).
57. Upon the death of a veteran, periodic monetary benefits to which he or
she was entitled at death, or those based on evidence in file at the date of
death and due and unpaid for up to two years, shall be paid to survivors in
this order: (1) spouse, (2) children, and (3) dependent parents. 38 U.S.C. §
5121(a)(2) (1996); 38 C.F.R. § 3.1000(a)(1) (1998).
58. DIC compensation benefits are available to a surviving spouse, child or
dependent parent of a veteran who has died from a service-connected
disability or injury. 38 U.S.C. §§ 101(14) and 1317 (1998); 38 C.F.R. § 3.5(a),
(c) (1998).
59. The spouse and dependent children of a veteran who has died of a
service-connected disability are eligible for educational assistance. 38 U.S.C. §
35 (1998); 38 C.F.R. pt. 21, subpt. C (1998).
60. See 38 C.F.R. § 3.1600 with respect to burial expense allowances, grave
markers and national cemetery burial rights. 38 C.F.R. § 3.160(b)-(d), (f), (g)
(1998). Award of the burial allowance was an issue because after Nelson's
death in December 1994 the local VA office had told Anna that she was eligible
to receive the burial allowance. After she incurred the bill for Nelson's
funeral, but before it paid her the allowance, the VA reversed its decision and
refused to pay, on the ground that the award had been made in error, since the
bar to compensation also operated as a bar on payment of a burial allowance.
We appealed, and the issue was not resolved for two and a half years, as part
of the overall final resolution of the case.
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timely filed for inclusion of K's survivors as parties to the Agent
Orange [Payment] Program."
K's case was finally resolved after 30 additional months and
two additional hearings. Following a hearing in May 1995, the
hearing officer reaffirmed the bar to benefits by reasoning that
"service connection for [PTSD] is not in order when the evidence
does not establish a causal link between the diagnosis of [PTSD]
and military service, if there is no verifiable objective qualifying
stressor."62 This opinion was notably the first official VA document
to recognize evidence in the file indicating that Dr. Green had
rendered a diagnosis of PTSD. All previous decisions had ignored
it.
In February 1996, the Board of Veterans' Appeals held a
hearing on our appeal. We were determined to leave nothing to
chance with the record, so clinicians Michael Alevy and Jonathan
Kilburn, supported by work-study student Stephen Zakos,
prepared and submitted a thick binder containing 36 of our
Additional
strongest exhibits, including some new exhibits.
evidence was submitted in the weeks following the hearing. Some
of the evidence consisted of newly discovered medical, psychiatric,
and parole records. A 1976 community mental health services
report acknowledged K's severe alcohol problem, yet also
suggested that "upon more careful examination the problem
appears to be more of one involving anxiety and depression,
feelings of failure, feelings of worthlessness and helplessness." A
1982 forensic report recounted K's "marginal" early family life.
The report also revealed that he may have been sexually abused as
a youth (outside the home, at a residential youth placement).
Further, the report discussed K's service with the flame platoon in
Vietnam, the stabbing, the suicide attempts, the murder episodes,
chronic post-service depression and alcoholism. It concluded that
an insanity defense in his murder trial "might be successful." A
1989 letter from a VA psychologist, written when K had been
abstinent from alcohol for seven years, suggested that it would be
important for K "to eventually be able to process some of your
feelings, as a sober individual, regarding your experience in
Vietnam." The psychologist recommended that he contact the
local Vet Center to arrange participation in "some form of

61. This program provided payments to veterans or their survivors
benefiting from the court's decision in In re: "Agent Orange" Product Liability
Litigation, MDL No. 381 (E.D.N.Y. 1985). The class action resulted in
creation of a settlement fund of $180 million, a portion of the fund was set
aside to help fund the activities of programs which could assist the class, such

as NVLSP. Our client, Anna, received a modest distribution from the fund.
62. Dep't of Veterans Affairs, Hearing Officer's Decision, at 5 (May 2, 1995)

(enclosed as Supplemental Statement of the Case, VA to Anna K, October 20,
1995). Clinician Scott Moore represented Anna at this hearing.
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posttraumatic stress group meetings/workshop, etc." He went to
the Vet Center, and a counsellor there in 1991 wrote that K's work
on his problems "allowed him to re-learn to be a citizen in this
society. I say re-learn because Mr. [Ki's Vietnam experiences and
subsequent life-style allowed him to drift outside this socities (sic)
behavioral norms."
Finally, a 1995 letter, written by a
psychologist who had known Nelson since 1973, said that Nelson
was in treatment for chronic alcoholism and depression from 1973
to 1980, and during that time "was tireless in his efforts" as a
volunteer to help open a fledgling detoxification center in
Burlington, Vermont. He added:
At the time I treated [Nelson], not much was known about Post
Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD). Looking back, however, he
certainly displayed many of the symptoms. He was decidedly
hypervigilant and I recall him having a very restricted range of
affect. He was avoidant and aloof, but I could discern that he
wanted to be a part of the social group but somehow feared
contact.... Most significantly, [Nelson] never mentioned his
veteran status to me until after he was convicted of homicide. I can
only speculate that [Nelson] suffered from PTSD, but it is my
opinion that he did. (emphasis in original) I believe that there is a
strong likelihood that his alcoholism arose from self-medication of
his PTSD.
Col. Loper, K's former commanding officer, provided us with a
new fax describing in detail the command structure of the 15th
Engineer Battalion. Headquarters and Headquarters Company, to
which K's records indicated he was attached, contained several
sections and platoons, including a "Tank Dozer Platoon" and a
"Flame Platoon," as well as "Two Infantry Platoons w/aprox 24
Boston Whalers and 24 Airboats.""' He also described vehicular
incidents involving casualties caused by ambushes, two of which
resembled incidents described by K in his affidavit. We later
submitted a deposition of Col. Loper, in which he discussed the
command structure of the 15th Engineer Battalion, the flame
platoon, and various incidents, in greater detail, and also
answered questions relating K's MOS, or military occupational
specialty, to his duty with the flame platoon."
63. Facsimile from Col. Thomas Loper (U.S. Army Ret.) 2 (Feb. 5, 1996) (on
file with the South Royalton Legal Clinic).
64. Telephone Deposition of Col. Thomas Loper (U. S. Army Ret.), Feb. 15,
1996. In a follow up letter, Col. Loper shed light on a subject of particular
interest to the local VA adjudication office: K's training and how it related to
his later combat role. Interpreting C's DA Form 20, he noted:
[K] did complete the Basic Combat, and Advanced Individual Training
at Fort Dix, the first of which is basic Infantry, so it cannot be said that
[K] had no combat training. Advanced Individual Training or MOS
training also has considerable "infantry" type training ....

[K] was a

Track Vehicle Mechanic, and the Flame Track was a tracked vehicle. So
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The Department of the Army provided us with the
declassified Operational Report of the 15th Engineer Battalion for
the quarter ending January 31, 1968. The entry for Headquarters
Company included details concerning "The Flame Tank Platoon,"
which "has been used extensively for job site security and support
to the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd [Brigades] and the RTAVR [Republic of
Thailand Army Volunteer Regiment]." 6 It recounted that:
[t]wo flame tracks have been engaged in operations with the MRF
[Mobile Riverine Force]. The tracks are taken aboard the boats and
provide effective direct fire on enemy positions along the waterways.
The remaining two flame tracks were found effective in clearing
heavily booby trapped areas. During the period the flame tracks
expended a total of 10,800 gallons of napalm. f6
From the archives of the U.S. Army Military History Institute
came an excerpt from a history of the 9th Infantry Division
entitled "May Offensive and Battle of Y-Bridge." It detailed how
in May 1968 elements of the 9th Infantry, 3d Brigade, fought a
major five day battle with Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Army
forces on the southern outskirts of Saigon, at and around the Y
Bridge, about two miles from the center of Saigon and the
Presidential Palace. 7
the assignment to HCC, 9th Inf Div was not unusual.
Letter from Col..Thomas Loper 1 (Feb. 20, 1996) (on file with the South
Royalton Legal Clinic).
65. Dep't of the Army, Headquarters, 15th Engineer Battalion, 9th Infantry
Division, OperationalReport for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January 1968, to
Commanding General, 9th Infantry Division (Jan. 31, 1968) (Unclassified).
66. Id. An additional piece of evidence about the "flame platoons" came
from an article describing the history and command structure of the
"Riverines." Established in 1966 by Army and Navy planners as a way to
insert U.S. troops into a densely populated and geographically difficult area,
the unit was called the Mekong Delta Mobile Afloat Force (MDMAF) and was
designated Task Force 117 (TF-117); its code name was the Mobile Riverine
Force (MRF). Mobile Riverine Force (TF-117), ARMY DIG. June 1972. The
article depicted the "mother ships," U.S.S Benewah and U.S.S. Colleton, and
described the Monitors, standard Riverine boats used for close fire support.
One photograph of a Monitor had this cut line: "This particular Monitor has
had the forward 40mm turret replaced with two flame throwers. Nicknamed
'ZIPPOs', these craft were used to burn away the dense jungle foliage which
often grew down to the water's edge." Id.
67. The abstract is taken from The Infantry: 9th Infantry Division Papers,
"The 9th Infantry Division in Vietnam, 1966-70." The transmittal fax from the
Military History Institute notes: "Most references are to 3d Bde. involvement.
Still doesn't preclude small attachments [from other brigades]". Facsimile
from Dave Keough, U.S. Army Military History Institute 1 (Feb. 6, 1996) (on
file with the South Royalton Legal Clinic). In any event, the abstract
demonstrates the importance of the Y Bridge location and lends some support
to K's assertion that he (a member of the 2d Brigade) was detailed there
briefly at some point (he recalled it being during the Tet Offensive). In May
1968, the NVA launched what have been termed "mini-Tet Offensives" against
several cities. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE VIETNAM WAR, supra note 40, at 540.

The John Marshall Law Review

[32:87

Following the hearing and our refusal to waive review of the
new evidence by the local VA office, the VA issued a Supplemental
Statement of the Case, and again denied benefits based upon the
character of discharge. The VA considered only one type of new
evidence, the former commander's deposition and letter, and said
that that evidence did "not contain hard evidence that Mr. [K]
engaged in combat."6 Clinician Jonathan Kilburn filed objections,
faulting the VA for failing to consider all the evidence on record,
for not giving sufficient reasons for rejection of corroborating
evidence, and for not assisting the claimant in developing facts
pertinent to his claim.69 In response, the VA filed yet another
Supplemental Statement, expanding the amount of new evidence
considered, and recharacterizing the issues. On the issue of
accrued benefits, it said it could consider "only that evidence in file
at the time of Mr. [K]'s death," and denied benefits.7" On the issue
of burial payments and service-connected death benefits, it again
denied benefits, but, considering the new evidence, conceded that
it:
substantially verifies Mr. [K]'s affidavit where he related various
episodes while in Viet Nam. Resolving any doubt in Mr. [K]'s favor,
we concede that Mr. K was exposed to combat situations based on
the lay statements submitted. However, the evidence does not show
that his combat experiences were the cause of his problems after his
return from Viet Nam and the character of his subsequent release
from service."v
In October 1996, clinician Mark Klarich responded with a
powerful brief summarizing our entire case. He included legal
authority for the proposition that evidence can be accepted after
death if it is corroborating evidence.12 Subsequently, the Board of
This fax was forwarded to us by Diana Harrington, Staff Assistant, Office of
U.S. Sen. James Jeffords (R. VT). Ms. Harrington assisted us with great zeal

and effectiveness in the latter stages of the case. We also received assistance
from David Weinstein, Staff Assistant, Office of U.S. Rep. Bernard Sanders

(Ind. VT).
68. U.S. Dep't of Veterans Affairs, Supplemental Statement of the Case
(Apr. 1, 1996).
69. See Trytek v. Derwinski, 3 Vet.App. 153 (1992) and Zarycki v. Brown, 6
Vet. App. 91 (1993) in support of these arguments.
70. U.S. Dep't of Veterans Affairs, Supplemental Statement of the Case
(June 26, 1996).
71. Id.
72. See Hayes v. Brown, 4 Vet. App. 353 (1993) and VA ADJUDICATION
PROCEDURE MANUAL M21-1
5.06(a) (Aug. 16, 1996) ("Entitlement must be
based on evidence in file or deemed in file at date of death."). As to what may
be deemed, see paragraph 27.08(b) (July 14, 1995) ("[A] claimant may confirm

the prima facie evidence in file at the date of death by submitting evidence in
connection with the claim for accrued benefits") as well as paragraph 5.27(b)
(May 8, 1995) ("The cited regulations also provide for the acceptance of
evidence after death for verifying or corroborating evidence 'in file' at death.").
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Veterans' Appeals in Washington, D.C. reviewed the file. In July
1997, the Board, in a 26-page decision, concluded that insanity
existed at the time K committed the offenses leading to his
discharge, and thus the character of discharge was not a bar to
receipt of VA benefits.73 Further, the Board found that the
evidence (all of which apparently was considered) was in equipoise
as to the existence of the combat-related stressors K reported.74
The Board afforded the appellant the statutory benefit of the
doubt75 in ruling that the record supported a grant of service
connection for PTSD for accrued benefits purposes. On remand,
the VA awarded accrued benefits, plus DIC and dependents'
educational benefits, and the burial allowance. 6
3. Reflections on the Case
Nelson K's case lasted for a longer time than any of us
expected at the first interview. But then, none of us knew how
time-consuming it was to assemble our proof, or what turns the
case would take. The major delay occurred at the front end.
Clinicians worked to understand the complexities of the federal
statute and regulations 7 to identify all the legal issues, and to
develop necessary proofs. In that regard, the case was well-suited
to our clinic. Proof was developed in a creative way from many
sources: personal, administrative, military, medical and historical.
The legal issues, manageable in number, were complex but not
overly so. Successive students, sometimes working in teams, made
the proof (and legal) picture clearer each semester.
This case challenged, but did not overwhelm, clinicians
assigned to it (though they often felt overwhelmed when they took
the case over, seeing the increasing size of the file). 6 Work on the

73. U.S. Dep't of Veterans Affairs, Bd. of Veterans Appeals, Decision (July
31, 1997).
74. Id
75. See 38 U.S.C. § 5107(b) (1998).
76. U.S. Dep't of Veterans Affairs, Bd. of Veterans Appeals, Decision (Aug.

26, 1997).
77. One clinician who played a leading role in the case, stated in his final
evaluation of his clinic experience that:
[w]orking on my VA case was a real test of my patience and sanity. Title
38 [of the U.S. Code] is the most convoluted piece of legislation I have
ever read-just as bad as the tax code-and if I managed, to some degree,
to work through it, there is little doubt in my mind about my ability to
analyze and interpret statutes in the future.

Memorandum from David Royer, Student Intern, South Royalton Legal Clinic
2 (Apr. 27, 1994) (on file with South Royalton Legal Clinic).
78. See generally Naomi R. Cahn & Norman Schneider, The Next Best
Thing: Transferred Clients, 36 CATH. U. L. REV. 367 (1987) (presenting several
case management issues noted in Nelson K's case). We relied primarily upon
transfer memos, multi-person case reviews, and meetings of the supervisor

and clinicians (including, at various times, and in various combinations, the

The John MarshallLaw Review

[32:87

case waxed and waned in intensity depending on whether a
hearing was imminent (or whether the client had a personal crisis
develop, which did occur). Some students, such as those who
prepared for and appeared at hearings, had broader experiences
than others, but many of those other students made evidentiary
breakthroughs.
The hearings, while requiring a good deal of preparation,
were less intense compared to many of our family law contests.
Yet the case was compelling due to the great breadth of proof
required, evolving legal issues, a strong emotional component
based on our client's condition, and the case's subject matter.
Aspects of Nelson K's story were representative of the stories of
many Americans who served in Vietnam and returned home
permanently affected by their experiences. His story called out for
more light, more explanation, more understanding, and, to meet
the VA's requirements, more proof. Fortunately, the case allowed
us to match several students to it who were personally interested
for various reasons: one student was a military institute graduate,
and three were veterans (one of them served with the U.S. Army
in Vietnam). On the other hand, another student forthrightly
acknowledged toward the end of his successful tenure on the case
that he didn't much like it, thus providing us with valuable
material for discussion.
Compared to what might be learned on a typical difficult
public benefits class action, or appellate effort, Nelson K's case
presented great diversity. Students either communicated directly
with our medical expert, or had to employ his findings effectively.
There were joint case reviews with outside medical and social
work experts. Aside from learning about the formal structure of
the VA and the military, clinicians learned about a vitally
important parallel "shadow" structure of resources (i.e., the
National Veterans Legal Services Project, the U.S. Armed Services
Center of Research of Unit Records, the local VA in-house
Veterans' Service Center, the local "Vet Center", the staffs of two
of the client's elected representatives to Congress, etc.). With
respect to the VA, the students learned that the it is a complex
organization: on the one hand, one can access and even develop
excellent information from the medical and social services
providers; on the other, one should not expect a particularly liberal
or sympathetic hearing outcome (even while being treated with
great courtesy and afforded full due process rights), unless the
evidence is very strongly in favor of the veteran. Particularly
fascinating to the students was the chance to perform (or manage)

current student, and the former and incoming students assigned to the case)
to maintain file control and current knowledge of the case and client.
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original historical research on the Vietnam War,79 involving
contact with Army and Navy historical repositories; unit research
at the National Archives; review of military unit reports (some
formerly classified), and specialized journal articles and
monographs on Army and Navy operations. A high point of
student-directed case development involved locating the former
commander of K's unit, and enlisting his aid in clarifying the
unit's structure, function, and experiences. On the personal level,
a few clinicians and their supervisor learned about the dying and
death of a client, the involvement of institutions in that process,
and the unresolved issue of payment of K's funeral bill.
Clinicians working on this case were captivated by the desire
to develop the facts and tell Nelson K's story. To be successful,
they had to exercise a wide range of legal skills: interviewing,
researching legal issues, "mapping" informal discovery sources,
conducting discovery, drafting, hearing preparation, and
conducting hearings, etc. The work in sum addressed a healthy
number of the commonly accepted goals of clinical legal
education, 0 including two of the most important, cultural/crosscultural awareness and ethics. As to the former, they learned of
Nelson K's often difficult upbringing, patterns of behavior under
stress in the military, and the effects of PTSD, which included
dysfunctional personal behavior within subcultures of drugs and
alcohol, and a crime for which K was imprisoned. Students were
also forced to think about many issues raised by the war,
particularly why and where and how it was fought, its intensity
and the level of human misery and dislocation it entailed, how the
United States' stated objectives were reflected in the military
documents they read, and what the short and long-term effects
were upon everyone involved due to the sheer volume of firepower
used by both sides.8'
79. Most of the students were too young to have any memory of that

conflict, but all had been constantly exposed to the lore and legend of it
through the news media and particularly through popular culture by way of
movies such as APOCALYPSE Now, PLATOON, and MISSING IN ACTION, to name
but a few. The original research allowed them to get some understanding of
what the conflict (and the military reporting of it) was like, day-to-day, in a
hotly contested zone. Equally important, the research also provided, via
specialized articles and declassified documents, insights into contemporary
military thinking about the conduct and progress of the war.
80. See supra note 25 and related textual discussion.
81. What was learned working on this case would have enabled the clinical
students to read with enhanced knowledge and understanding such
"traditional" works on the war as JONATHAN SCHELL, THE VILLAGE OF BEN
SUC (Random House 1967); NEIL SHEEHAN, ET AL., THE PENTAGON PAPERS:
THE SECRET HISTORY OF THE VIETNAM WAR... AS PUBLISHED BY THE NEW
YORK TIMES (Bantam Books 1971); FRANCES FITZGERALD, FIRE IN THE LAKE
(Little, Brown and Co. 1972), as well as such contemporary works as HAROLD
G. MOORE & JOSEPH L. GALLOWAY, WE WERE SOLDIERS ONCE... AND YOUNG
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As to ethics, although we faced few real dilemmas, one stands
out: to what extent, and in what way, should we help prepare
Nelson for his hearing testimony, particularly as to his reasons for
going AWOL upon his return to the United States?
The
regulations suggested that the more sympathetic the reason for
his AWOL, the more sympathetic the hearing officer's decision
might be.82 We decided against any intensive preparation on this
point for several reasons, believing at bottom that our client
should tell his story in his own unique way."3
B. Mark R
1.

The Case

In February 1989, Rita L., Mark R's fiancee, sought the
clinic's
help
in obtaining Dependency
and Indemnity
Compensation from the Veterans' Administration for her infant
son, based upon his father's suicide in August 1988. The VA
denial was based on a finding that the death was not due to a
(Harper Collins 1992) (reciting details of the pivotal Battle of the Ia Drang
Valley in November 1965) and ERIC T. DEAN, SHOOK OVER HELL POSTTRAUMATIC STRESS, VIETNAM AND THE CIVIL WAR (Harvard University Press

1997) (comparing the psychological effects of violence on soldiers in the Civil
and Vietnam Wars, examining the origins of PTSD as a recognized disorder,
and calling into question popularly accepted views of the Vietnam veteran as
singularly affected by trauma due to the nature of that war).
82. Any intensive preparation we might have done would, of course, have
been based upon Nelson's recollection of his reasons, and would have been
done ethically. The problem was that what he could recall of his reason(s) so
many years later was fairly vague and presented evidence of (we thought)
more a kind of massive mental and emotional disengagement existing at the
time than the kinds of very specific reasons set out by the regulations as
possibly justifying or excusing going AWOL. To try to organize K's
recollections, such as they were, into testimony was to raise three ethical flags:
first, it raised the question of whether we would be beginning a process in
which he unconsciously began to recall reasons of the type suggested by the
regulations; second, would any attempt by us to organize his recollections be
an exercise by us in incompetence, causing his story, otherwise to be told in
his own unique and chiseled words, to be put into an artificial and
unconvincing format?
Third, if we strongly influenced his manner of
expressing his recollections, would we be simply dominating our client, based
upon his dependence upon us? In any event, although our client was aware of
the regulations' examples, he never showed the slightest inclination to modify
his story to try to fit his experience into them. Under these circumstances, to
tamper with his manner of expressing why he went AWOL seemed
inadvisable.
83. Nelson K did tell his story in his own unique way, and the hearing
officer specifically found his, reasons not to constitute "compelling
circumstances" to excuse the AWOL. However, we were prepared for this, and
argued later, based upon the medical evidence, that his description of his
historical reasons for going AWOL was an example of the emotional state, past
and present, of a person with PTSD.
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Over the next fourteen
service-connected disease or injury.
months three clinicians84 worked relentlessly to establish that the
veteran suffered from a "disease", PTSD, that was serviceconnected and caused his death. During the fourteen months, the
clinicians demonstrated that on the medical side, the VA appeared
to have lost track of an earlier-made PTSD diagnosis, and on the
administrative side, the VA had ignored a massively compelling
case for the existence of PTSD.
This case was constructed upon a solid foundation of factgathering and evidence development supporting pillars of proof.
Military service records were obtained from one place, military
and private medical records from other sources. Clinicians
obtained addresses of family members and old and recent friends.
The clinicians also conducted interviews and prepared affidavits.
A key piece of evidence which had been relied upon in denying
benefits was subject to reinterpretation and legal modification due
to the development of new psychiatric evidence.
While this process was typical for case preparation, and does
not appear to be complex (even if it is labor-intensive), it was
complex enough to present a first-rate learning experience for law
students, particularly when one added legal analysis to the
equation. Equally as important, this process of administrative law
representation allowed a small group of law students to change an
official U.S. government determination. Moreover, the students
forever altered the child's life prospects, the child's view of who his
8
father was, and why he died.
A brief review of the initial VA view of Mark R's life,
compared with the view it adopted after our hearing presentation,
demonstrates the value of the representation, and of the learning

84. The clinicians were Maureen Holland, who did the initial intake and
evidence gathering, Laura Brevitz, who developed and managed the case as a
summer work-study student, and Tony Hernandez, who synthesized all the
evidentiary leads, put together final forms of affidavits, prepared witnesses,
and represented our client at hearing before a VA hearing officer.

85. We are reliably informed by the child's mother, Rita, that he often takes
his father's photograph to school. Some day that child will be told why his
father died. Which version is better, the VA's initial determination, which did
not reflect reality, or its decision after hearing, which did? The answer may lie
in another case handled by our clinic, in which a girl in her mid-teens and her
mother sought our help to overturn a decision by the Social Security

Administration that the woman's deceased husband was not actually the
father of the girl, although she had been conceived during the marriage, had
always been told he was her father, and had been raised by him in a nuclear
family situation with her mother and siblings. Upon receiving notification
from SSA of its negative paternity decision, the girl's behavior took a nosedive
and she dropped out of school. When she came to our clinic for an interview,
her forearm bore a large scab which spelled out the name of the man she had

known as, and still believed to be, her father. She had scraped in his name
with a knife.
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experience. Despite the VA's having had the same opportunity to
locate the same records and witnesses we discovered, its
Statement of the Case summarized R's life in 10 lines, listing the
following: two periods of service (1966-1974, honorable discharge;
1974-1976, separated under honorable conditions); a December
1983 VA psychiatric examination which showed "no evidence of
psychiatric disability" and at which "alcohol dependence was
diagnosed"; in February 1984 service connection was disallowed
for a claimed nervous condition, and in August 1988 "[t]he veteran
died of a self-inflicted gunshot wound.
Alcohol abuse was
implicated on the Death Certificate." On this record, the three line
"Reasons for Decision" entry was no surprise: "There is no
evidence to suggest that the veteran's self-inflicted gunshot wound
was the product of service connected disease or injury. Service
connection may not be established for death which results from
alcohol abuse." 6
Our search for evidence of combat experience and likely
stressors was markedly different in this case compared to what we
would experience when representing Nelson K almost two years
later. Rita told us he said he had experienced very significant
combat. Another witness told us Mark told him that he had
"thrown away all his medals" at one point.
Over the next several months we assembled, from various
sources, the story of his overseas service. Military discharge
records showed that he had served with both the 82d and 101st
Airborne Divisions in Vietnam, obtained expert and sharpshooter
badges for operation of the M-16 rifle, and rose to the rank of
sergeant before being reduced in rank to private just before his
final discharge in 1976. (The reduction in rank was the result of
convictions for AWOL offenses occurring in 1976 when he was
stationed in the Canal Zone). For three separate enlistment
periods, his badges and awards were as follows: (1966-68)Combat Infantryman's Badge, Parachutist Badge, Vietnamese
Service Medal, Vietnamese Campaign Medal w/Device, and
Overseas Service Bar; (1968-74)-The same as for 1966-68, plus
four more Overseas Service Bars, National Defense Service Medal,
Bronze Star Medal with 'V (Valor) Device, and Bronze Star Medal
with 1st-3d Oak Leaf Clusters, (1974-76)-The same as for 196668 (except for Overseas Service Bar), plus National Defense
Service Medal, Good Conduct Medal, Vietnam Cross of Gallantry
with Palm, Bronze Star, and Silver Star. A correction form also
showed that he had been awarded the Purple Heart on an
unspecified date. From another U.S. Army records center, we
obtained the citations that went with the Bronze and Silver Stars,

86. Veterans Administration, Statement of the Case, in the Appeal of MR
(Dec. 15, 1989).
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and Purple Heart, and they established (to put it mildly) the
existence of stressors." We also discovered that he had been
awarded the Air Medal for having participated in over twenty-five
aerial missions between January and November 1971 "in support
of counterinsurgency operations."
In preparation for the appeal hearing, we conducted a search
of available literature on PTSD and alcohol abuse and their
interaction, with the cooperation of the National Center for PTSD,
located within the VA Regional Office complex at White River
Junction, Vermont. Although not submitted into evidence at
hearing, the voluminous literature we copied helped us to
understand our own case and to confidently discuss the alcohol
issue with our experts. We also developed affidavits based upon
the accounts of family and friends which contained more evidence
of stressors and PTSD symptoms, in which Mark R. talked of: guns
and occasionally about killing people; a landmine explosion which
injured Mark R. killed the soldier in front of him; one occasion in
Vietnam when he had to sleep under dead bodies to keep warm.
Additionally, he had frequent mood shifts, difficulty being
affectionate and had to be awakened with great care (some people
prodded him with a broom) or he could react violently. Mark R.
had great trouble sleeping due to intrusive dreams about his
Vietnam experiences. He drank alcohol to get to sleep. He often
87. The Silver Star, the second highest award for battlefield valor below the
Congressional Medal of Honor, was awarded for R's actions on December 23,
1970, while serving with Company E, 4th Battalion (Airborne), 503d Infantry,
173d Airborne Brigade. The commendation reads in part:
On that date, during the early morning hours, a large enemy force
breached the defensive wire of Stag 8 and moved into the perimeter.
Sergeant [R] was on guard at the northern end of the perimeter when
the enemy initiated the attack by destroying the fire direction center
bunker at the southern end of the perimeter. Undaunted by the intense
small arms and mortar fire, Sergeant [R] aggressively moved
throughout the area insuring that his personnel were located in the best
possible fighting positions. Exposing himself to fierce enemy small arms
fire, Sergeant [R] carried several wounded comrades from their fighting
positions to the temporary aid station for medical attention.
Throughout the ensuing battle, he personally directed the retaliatory
fires of his men while repeatedly exposed to intense hostile fire, and was
most instrumental in reconsolidating positions near the northern end of
the perimeter. Sergeant [R] then directed the reaction force into the
perimeter and personally lead them in clearing the entire position of
enemy soldiers.
The Purple Heart was awarded for wounds received on April 8, 1968, but no
description of the incident accompanied the award certificate. (Other evidence
of record indicates that on that date he sustained multiple fragment wounds to
the left and right legs, and left arm. On May 6 he was transferred to Walter
Reed Army Medical Center in Washington, D.C. and returned to duty on June
18). The last Bronze Star was received for personally leading troops in
repelling either the same or another enemy perimeter breach (no date is given
on the citation), resulting in fifteen enemy killed.

The John MarshallLaw Review

[32:87

reacted strongly to loud noises, and on several occasions, after
hearing them, said that people were shooting at him. In Vietnam,
a friend he was drinking with went to a jeep for cigarettes and was
killed when the booby-trapped jeep exploded. He questioned how
an entire platoon could be killed while he survived. Despite his
heavy drinking, Mark R. was unable to escape his disturbing
dreams.
At the hearing, clinic student Hernandez argued that the
VA's December 5, 1983, psychiatric exam, relied on to deny
benefits, simply missed the PTSD symptomology. We were able to
point to the veteran's 1976 medical separation report, which
indicated frequent trouble sleeping, nervous trouble and
depression; and five affidavits from friends and family members
attesting to behavior consistent with PTSD symptoms. Further,
we also noted a 1978 medical diagnosis of depressive neurosis, a
1984 VA diagnosis of alcohol dependence with depression, and a
1987 Indiana VA Medical Center diagnosis of PTSD (not referred
to in the local VA Office's 1989 denial of benefits). On August 1,
1988, his fiancee had taken Mark R. to the local VA Medical
Center where he complained of "losing it" and sought "medication
for nerves."
As new and material evidence to support a new factual basis
for service connection, we submitted two recently written reports
by experts on PTSD. The first was a five page "psychiatric
autopsy" completed by John P. Wilson, Ph.D., an internationally
recognized expert on PTSD. Having reviewed the body of evidence
in the case, Dr. Wilson concluded that R's suicide "was in all
likelihood caused by the existence of his post-traumatic stress
disorder, chronic and untreated which, in turn, led to alcohol
abuse and dysthymia." 8 The second report was from David A.
Grady, Psy.D., a former member of the VA's Advisory Committee
on the Readjustment Problems of Vietnam Veterans.
He
concluded that Mark R. suffered from PTSD as a result of his
Vietnam experiences, that his alcoholism was secondary to, that is,
a manifestation of, the PTSD, and that he took his own life as a
direct result of this service-connected condition. 9 (A third report
which reached the same conclusions, written by a New Hampshire
psychiatrist, was received too late to be put into evidence, and so
was held in reserve as new evidence if further appeal was
necessary).
A final piece of evidence was also persuasive. In the days
prior to the hearing, clinician Hernandez showed the accumulated
exhibits to the Vermont Regional Medical Examiner who had
88. Letter from John P. Wilson, Ph.D. 1 (Apr. 3, 1990) (on file with the
South Royalton Legal Clinic).
89. Letter from David A. Grady, Psy.D., 1 (Apr. 10 and May 8, 1990) (on file
with the South Royalton Legal Clinic).
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completed the initial Report of Investigation on the suicide. On
the day of Mark's death, the examiner had written "? Alcohol
Abuse" in response to the form question "Other Contributory
Medical Conditions." He also had checked a box that said "Serious
Depression/Mental Disorder." All of this information was based on
hearsay. When it came time for the official Death Certificate to be
filled out, the simple phrase "alcohol abuse" was typed in as a
response to a categorical question which read: "Other Significant
Conditions: Conditions contributing to death but not related to
cause given [above, i.e., gunshot wound]." It was this small entry
on which the VA had built its initial denial. Upon reviewing all
the evidence in the case, the medical examiner concluded that the
original Death Certificate was in error. Accordingly, he petitioned
the probate court to change that entry on the certificate, so that
the response to the "Other Significant Conditions" category would
read: "Post Traumatic Stress Disorder; Alcohol Abuse." The court
approved the petition two days before our hearing, and the hearing
officer cited this change in his decision reversing the initial denial,
and finding service connection for the cause of death.9 °
2. Reflections on the Case
The Mark R case was both less complex than the Nelson K
case would prove to be, and less difficult overall. Yet it presented
a significant challenge to the students, because it moved on a
fairly rapid timeline. Our client, the single mother of an orphan,
had great financial need, and it was the first case of its type our
clinic had handled.
Our proof problems were demanding, requiring that we
rapidly develop facility with the law governing service-connected
disability, PTSD, suicide and alcoholism.
The students also
needed to discover all available medical and service information,
and work up new medical evidence based upon both alreadydiscovered evidence and other new evidence we were
simultaneously working up, such as affidavits from family and

90. In light of the evidence, the hearing officer did not dwell to any extent
on the VA's subtle regulations dealing with suicide and chronic use of alcohol.
See 38 C.F.R. § 3.302 (1998); 38 C.R.F. § 3.301 (1998). We, however, spent a
fair amount of time analyzing the interplay between the two regulations. The
regulation on alcohol, in particular, made it appear at first glance impossible
to qualify for benefits if alcohol had anything to do with the cause of death.
(Under the regulation, benefits are not payable for willful misconduct; a
veteran's death will be considered to be the result of willful misconduct "[i]f, in
the drinking of a beverage to enjoy its intoxicating effects, intoxication results
proximately and immediately in disability or death." 38 C.F.R. § 3.301). In
Mark R's case, having such a wealth of evidence on stressors not only made it

possible to establish the existence of PTSD, but also to obtain medical reports
which established that the cause of the suicide was untreated PTSD, and that
the alcohol use was merely a manifestation of the PTSD.
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friends. Completed in just fourteen months, the case yielded huge
rewards for Mark's son, and for our clinic, as it gave us a roadmap
for approaching other such cases.
The case was a type that a civil law school clinic should be
able to handle, assuming a willingness to carry cases from term-toterm. Aside from the task of mastering the law and locating all
pertinent records, the case afforded each clinician an unforgettable
series of interviews. They compared interviews to one another and
the record, then rolled them into affidavits and preparation of
hearing testimony. The case was a triumph from the standpoint of
at least one aspect of supervision, in matching the students to a
case likely to benefit from their existing strengths and at the same
time providing them with challenging learning experiences. The
student who did intake and the original broad-ranging legal
research was a born proceduralist and researcher. The student
who next took it for over seven months was highly disciplined,
analytical, and a born case manager.
The clinician who
represented the client at hearing was a talented and passionate
advocate.
Aside from the internal case reviews to which the file was
subjected, most light was shed on it by our medical experts
commenting upon the military, medical and personal evidence we
supplied to them. The very fruitful interchanges with these
experts was built upon the students' prior close reading of all
existing records, the materials from the National Center for PTSD,
and the DSM-III-R. Along the way the students also learned
about backup resources, such as NVLSP and the Armed Services
Center for Research of Unit Records. They also learned about the
Vietnam War and the Veterans Administration.
Mark R's case proceeded fairly rapidly along orderly lines of
inquiry, following the early probing interviews. As in Nelson K's
case, a wide range of legal skills was exercised, particularly
interviewing and case preparation. In light of the conduct and
outcome of the case, I would list the most prominent clinical goals
addressed to have been responsibility, service, cultural and crosscultural awareness, understanding the role of emotions, creativity,
and critiquing the legal system. On the other hand, the case
presented no significant ethical dilemmas and only limited
counselling opportunities, nearly all dealing with tangential issues
and matters, such as eligibility for Social Security Survivors
benefits and certain income maintenance problems.
CONCLUSION

Nelson K and Mark R were transporting experiences which
placed our clinicians and faculty inside different lives, alongside a
dying veteran, his widow and daughter, and with the orphaned
son and bereaved fiancee of another veteran. Second and third
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year law students heard the stories our clients had unsuccessfully
tried to tell the VA during their lifetimes, and they persuaded the
it to listen. All who worked on the cases learned something about
the Vietnam War, a segment of those who fought in it, and the
effects it had on them, their families, and even their societies.
Although the cases may not have met Paul Reingold's
definition of the "hard" case, since they were not controversial,
they were nonetheless difficult and challenging. Each case in its
own way presented legal issues and proof problems of a scope and
character not ordinarily handled by our program. Nelson K
figuratively outlived nearly all the students assigned to it. Due to
its sheer bulk and the breadth of its demands, Nelson K taxed the
abilities and patience of many of those who labored to understand
and advance it (but the clinic as an institution was not depleted by
it). Mark R, while not controversial or depleting, required novel
and substantial legal analysis and proof work to be successfully
accomplished in fourteen months by three clinicians. By
completing the Mark R case, the Clinic as an institution was
better prepared when confronted with Nelson K's problem.
These cases were well-suited to our clinic precisely because
they were novel, challenging and tough, but not so difficult that
they overwhelmed us. With just three clinical faculty (and one of
them facing job funding uncertainty), tenure and retention
writing, committee and public service obligations, an ongoing
school and clinic commitment to help start a legal clinic at
Petrozavodsk State University in Karelia, Russia, and the need to
make sure all of our clinical students have as balanced a set of
learning experiences as possible, we are stretched thin enough so
that each new case must be analyzed carefully with respect to the
impact it might have on the program. In my experience, some
cases, such as Kendall, have threatened to (but in fact did not)
overwhelm both the program and the students assigned to them.
Indeed, in that case, we strove to spread out the work as able and
give to the clinicians working on it other, different cases involving
different skills. In contrast, these veterans cases gave us a broad
range of lawyering challenges and opportunities for significant
public service in a manageable format.9' In providing that service
in a competent and zealous way, our clinic's reputation was
enhanced. The cases also positioned us to be able to begin to

91. One important strand of clinical scholarship stresses that public service
not be lost sight of as an important goal of clinical legal education, and an
important value that should be imparted by the general law school
curriculum. See, e.g., David Barnhizer, The Justice Mission of American Law
Schools, 40 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 285 (1992); Jill Chaifetz, The Value of Public
Service: A Model for Instilling a Pro Bono Ethic in Law School, 45 STAN. L.
REV. 1695 (1995) and Robert T. Dinerstein, Clinical Scholarship and the
Justice Mission, 40 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 469 (1992).
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participate, in a limited but real way, in an important new
initiative in veterans' law - the work of The Veterans Consortium
Pro Bono Program, which seeks to match volunteer attorneys with
veterans appearing pro se before the U.S. Court of Veterans
Appeals. 92 Both cases provided occasion for reflection on some of
the major themes in clinical teaching, such as how well we
listened, and what we thought was important, in client
interviews,93 and how we structured the attorney-clinician
supervisory relationship at a time when the supervising attorney
(the author) was sometimes very heavily committed with other
work obligations. 94
Too much should not be made of the fact that the veterans'
hearings were not based on the rules of evidence, or that there was
no opposing counsel. In my experience, it is often more difficult
trying to prove a tough case in the absence of highly qualified
opposing counsel than otherwise.
Qualified opposing counsel
92. The Veterans Consortium Pro Bono Program operates out of offices in

Washington, D.C. Brian D. Robertson, (202) 628-8164, is Director for Case
Evaluation and Placement, and David Addlestone, (202) 265-8305, is Director
for Outreach and Education.
93. The interviews raised questions about both our goals and techniques in
interviewing, and our evaluation and classification of the stories we heard.
The classification issue, that is, how we valued, or failed to value, things we
were told (or later read, based on the interviews), had a direct bearing on our
formulation of theories of the cases, what kinds of evidence we thought would
be persuasive, and how hard we worked to achieve certain goals. For example,
to Nelson K, it was vitally important that in his lifetime he establish his right,
as a veteran, to receive medical treatment at a VA hospital. That desire,
which appeared to exceed his interest in proving that he suffered from PTSD,
motivated us to pursue that issue aggressively. In his final illness he was
admitted to the VA medical facility (at a time when he could have been
admitted to another hospital and had many of his bills paid through
Medicaid). Because the VA treatment issue meant a great deal to him, it
meant a great deal to our clinicians. There is a substantial body of literature
on listening closely to clients' stories, so that the interviewing experience is an
enhancing, rather than an enfeebling, experience for them. Much of this
literature can be located by reviewing the bibliography of articles on clinical
legal education prepared by Prof. Karen Czapanskiy; it is accessible on the
World Wide Web at http://www.law.umab.edu/clinic/clinedu/. Among the
many who have written constructively, but not necessarily with a uniform
voice, on this subject are Anthony Alfieri; Robert Bastress and Joseph
Harbaugh; David Binder and Susan Price; Richard Delgado; Robert
Dinerstein; Gerald Lopez; Binny Miller, and Don and Martha Peters. Also see
Symposium, Lawyers As Storytellers & Storytellers As Lawyers: An
InterdisciplinarySymposium Exploring the Use of Storytelling in the Practice
of Law, 18 VT. L. REV. 565 (1994).
94. See Kenneth R. Kreiling, Clinical Education and Lawyer Competency:
The Process of Learning to Learn from Experience through Properly Structured
Clinical Supervision, 40 MD. L. REV. 284 (1981); Ann Shalleck, Clinical
Contexts: Theory and Practice in Law and Supervision, 21 NYU REV. L. &
SOC. CHANGE 109 (1993) (explaining useful insights on the subject of clinical
supervision).
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generally can be counted on (as in many cases we have had in both
federal and state courts) to clarify issues, to stipulate to given
facts, to respond to discovery with reliable information, and
No such
generally to try to make sense of the litigation.
clarification is generally forthcoming from an unrepresented
administrative agency (in any context), which often ignores key
evidence and fails to assist affirmatively in discovering hard-toPut another way, as one experienced
find existing evidence.
administrative law advocate said to me (and I paraphrase), "What
is harder, dealing with one or two lawyers, or having an entire
agency lined up against you?"
As Paul Reingold pointed out in his essay, we have an
obligation as clinical teachers to remain vitally interested and
interesting in our teaching and legal representation. However
local conditions shape the final choices, the process of careful case
selection across a broad range of case types and complexity holds
out the promise of our own personal and professional renewal and
growth, our students' enlightenment, and our clients' well-being.

